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Executive Summary

L

esotho is one of the most migration dependent countries in the
world. Migrant remittances are the country’s major source of
foreign exchange, accounting for 25% of GDP in 2006. Lesotho
is also one of the poorest countries in the world due to high
domestic unemployment, declining agricultural production, falling life
expectancy, rising child mortality and half the population living below
the poverty line. The majority of households and rural communities are
dependent on remittances for their livelihood. Households without access
to migrant remittances are significantly worse off than those that do have
such access.
Since 1990, patterns of migration from Lesotho to South Africa have
changed dramatically. These changes include significant increases in legal
and irregular cross-border movement between Lesotho and South Africa;
declining employment opportunities for Basotho men in the South
African gold mines; increased female migration from Lesotho; growing
internal female migration of young women within Lesotho; a ‘brain drain’
from Lesotho to South Africa and the growth of AIDS-related migration
in Lesotho. The central question addressed in this report is how these
changes have impacted remittance flows and usage.
For most of the twentieth century, the vast majority of migrants from
Lesotho were single young men who went to work on the South African
gold mines and remitted funds to their parents’ households. Migration
has become much more mixed in recent years and the profile of migrants
leaving Lesotho has changed significantly:
• The number of Basotho male migrants working on the mines
declined from 100,000 in 1990 to 46,000 in 2006. However, the
majority of male migrants from Lesotho are still mineworkers.
• The demographic profile of male migrants has shifted markedly.
Migrants used to be single young men. Now 84% are married and
77% are heads of households. Nearly 50% of migrants are over
the age of 40 and only 5% are under 25.
• Half of the growing number of female migrants from Lesotho are
domestic workers in South Africa. The rest are spread between
the informal sector (9%), commercial farmwork (5%), selfemployed businesses (6%), the professions (5%) and skilled manual work (5%). In other words, although one sector dominates,
female migrants work in a wider variety of jobs than males.
• On the whole, female migrants are younger than males but significant numbers of older women are also migrants. In contrast to
male migrants, only 27% of female migrants are married. On the
other hand, 42% are divorced, separated, abandoned or widowed.
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Most older women migrants fall into this category. A sizable
group of women thus has the responsibility of being the head of
their own household but have to migrate to South Africa in order
to ensure the survival of the household.
• Over 40,000 young, mostly single, women are "internal migrants"
working in Lesotho’s textile factories. The textile workers have
been called the ‘new miners’ though wages in the factories are
paltry compared with the mines. If the textile industry did not
exist, or closed down, then most of these women would probably
migrate to South Africa.
• Most migrants who work outside mining are irregular migrants
as the South African government is reluctant to give them work
permits. This increases their vulnerability to exploitation. Many
women are in South Africa on 30-day visitor’s passes and are supposed to return to Lesotho every 30 days to renew them. If they
do not, they have to pay a “fine” when they eventually return
home.
Changes in the profile of migration from Lesotho have impacted on
remittance flows in a number of ways:
• The decline in mine employment has not led to a decrease in
remittance flows to Lesotho. On the contrary, total remittance
flows increased as a result of increases in mine wages. But rising
remittance flows are directed to a shrinking number of households thus increasing inequality between households and accelerating levels of poverty and food insecurity for households that do
not have a mineworker.
• Female domestic workers in South Africa remit less to Lesotho
than male miners. This is primarily because they earn about a
third as much as their male counterparts. Domestic workers are
notoriously exploited in South Africa.
• Some migrants have second families or partners in South Africa.
In the case of male migrants, this tends to reduce the amount
remitted to Lesotho. In the case of female migrants, it often
increases the flow of remittances as they are able to remit some of
their partner’s earnings back home as well.
• The vast majority of cash remittances flow through informal
channels (usually carried by hand). Only 5% of migrants use the
Post Office and 2% the banks to remit.
Remittance-receiving households in Lesotho tend to use most of the
remittances for basic needs:
• Migrant remittances form an important, and in many cases,
the only, source of income for migrant-sending households in
Lesotho. Over 95% of the households with male migrant 
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members and 90% with female migrant members list remittances
as a source of household income. Fewer than 10% list income
from the second-ranking income source, non-migrant wage
labour.
• Most households (89%) say that the contribution of remittances
to household income is important or very important. Remittances
are also key to having enough food in the household (with nearly
90% saying that it is important or very important).
• The most common use of remittances is for food (90% of households spend remittances on food), clothing (76%), school fees
(56%) and fares for transportation (34%).
• Almost three quarters of households do not invest remittances
in agriculture. Of those that do, a quarter spend remittances on
seed, 18% on fertilizer, 12% on tractors and 4% on livestock.
Nearly 19% of households put some remittance income into
savings. Other expenditures such as funerals (incurred by 16%
of households) and funeral and burial insurance policies (29%)
reflect the impact of HIV and AIDS.
• Households with female migrants are more likely to supplement
remittance earnings with other sources of income.
• Remittances are not used on luxury consumer items but are used,
directly or indirectly, to meet the household’s subsistence needs.
• The proportion of households investing remittances in formal or
informal business is extremely low.
• In the rural villages, remittances are often “pooled” by women
through burial societies, grocery associations and egg circles. As
well as loaning money to be paid back with interest, the associations buy food and groceries in bulk to divide up among members.
Remittances are essential to household survival in Lesotho but the
opportunities for investing remittances in productive, developmental
activities are very limited. This suggests that it is important to stop
seeing Lesotho as the only site for entrepreneurship by migrants from
there. Companies from all over the world are permitted to come and do
business in South Africa. The same opportunity should be afforded to
Basotho households. Basotho should also be freely allowed to do business
in South Africa. Instead, migrants are more often viewed as a threat and
undesirable. Migration needs to be re-thought as something that is mutually beneficial for both countries. The only realistic option is to open the
borders for unrestricted travel in both directions and to allow Basotho to
pursue economic opportunities in South Africa free of harassment and
deportation.
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Introduction

L

esotho is one of the most migration-dependent countries in the
world. Out of a population of around two million people, over
240,000 were recently estimated to be outside the country.1
Migrant remittances are the country’s major source of foreign
exchange, accounting for 25% of GDP in 2006. Lesotho is also one of
the poorest countries in the world due to high domestic unemployment,
declining agricultural production, falling life expectancy, rising child
mortality and half the population living below the poverty line. The
majority of households and rural communities are dependent on remittances for their livelihood. Households without access to migrant remittances are significantly worse off than those that do have such access.
According to the 2006 Lesotho National Human Development Report,
“Migrant labourers’ remittances have played a critical role in providing
household incomes over a long period of time. Remittances from Basotho
migrant labourers in South Africa have allowed households to reduce
their dependence on agriculture and make investments to supplement
their farming activities.”2 While it is true that dependence on remittances stretches back many decades, this conclusion is highly misleading.
Indeed, it is only possible because of a basic lack of reliable, representative data on remittance flows, uses and impacts at the household level.
The relationship between migration, development and remittances in
Lesotho has been exhaustively studied for the period up to 1990.3 This
was an era when the vast majority of migrants from Lesotho were young
men working on the South African gold mines and over 50 percent of
households had a migrant mineworker. Since 1990, patterns of migration
to South Africa have changed dramatically. The reconfiguration of migration between the two countries has had a marked impact on remittance
flows to Lesotho. The central question addressed in this report is how the
change in patterns of migration from and within Lesotho since 1990 has
impacted on remittance flows and usage. Large claims have recently been
made by agencies such as the World Bank about the development potential of migrant remittances.4 In Lesotho, as this report will demonstrate,
such claims are overly optimistic. Remittance flows are a highly significant (often the only) source of income for many households. The loss
of remittances would plunge them into destitution, a fact that does not
suggest they are in a position to escape the “trap” of remittances-dependence through other sustainable forms of income generation.
Unlike in many migrant-sending countries, the contribution of remittances to poverty reduction and to development prospects in Lesotho
has been increasingly recognized at the policy level. In Lesotho’s 2004
Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP), for example, “migration features quite prominently in relation to discussion of the changing nature
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of livelihood and poverty trends over the last two decades.”5 Lesotho’s
2006 National Human Development Report mentions the significance of
migration to households on several occasions but misleadingly suggests
that it has become less important since 1990.6 The country’s presentation
at the 2006 UN High Level Dialogue on International Migration and
Development in New York also recognized the importance of development-oriented regional and national migration policies.7 Lesotho is committed to implementation of the African Union’s Strategic Framework
on International Migration and Common Position on Migration and
Development. Furthermore, Lesotho is the only country in Southern
Africa to have ratified the UN International Convention on the
Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of their
Families. Lesotho is also an active participant in the Migration Dialogue
for Southern Africa (MIDSA), an inter-governmental forum for policy
dialogue on migration within SADC.8
How to harness the potential of migration for development is a major
challenge for Lesotho.9 In order to initiate such a debate (in Lesotho
and South Africa), a comprehensive overview of Lesotho’s contemporary
migration patterns and trends is required. Secondly, there is a need for
nationally representative household data on remittance flows and their
uses and impacts. Thirdly, data on migration and remittances must be
disaggregated by gender in order to assess how changes in female migration are impacting remittance flows. Finally, information is needed on
whether remittances are simply used for household basic needs or spent
on consumer goods (as is commonly assumed) or whether, in fact, remittances are used for savings, investment and further wealth-generation for
the household, community and country.
The data collected for this project and the analysis that follows provide many new insights into the critical role of migration and remittances
in contemporary Lesotho. The policy implications of these findings are
considerable although, in general, they suggest that enthusiasm for the
development potential of remittances requires serious qualification in the
case of Lesotho. As this report argues, the dependence on remittances
for basic needs means that there is very little surplus for entrepreneurial
ventures. And, even if there was, the structural constraints on entrepreneurship are such that it is doubtful this would lead to a new remittanceled form of development in Lesotho. Nonetheless, this report examines
the obstacles to the ‘full enjoyment’ by households and communities of
their remittance packages. This basic finding – of the non-developmental
role of remittances in contemporary Lesotho – leads in turn to a broader
policy conclusion: enterprising Basotho will continue to be frustrated as
long as they are denied free access to the South African labour market
and the opportunity to try their entrepreneurial skills and instincts not
just in Lesotho but in South Africa as well.
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Methodology

S

AMP has been systematically studying the relationship between
migration, remittances and development in Southern Africa since
2000. Given the paucity of data on the subject, a multi-country
research initiative on migration and remittances was launched
in Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Swaziland and Zimbabwe.
A standardized household questionnaire, protocols for sampling and
all other aspects of data collection and processing were collaboratively
developed by SAMP partners. In addition to queries about migrant destinations, occupations and demographics, questions were asked about
remittance behaviour, the methods used for remittance transfer, the
role of remittances in the migrant-sending household economy, and the
impact of migrant remittances on migrant-sending households.
The Migration and Remittances Survey (or MARS) is national-scale
and statistically representative. Households were randomly selected and
included in the survey if they answered ’yes’ to the question: ‘Are there
migrants who work outside this country living in this household?’ A total
of 4,700 households were identified in the regional sample. The Lesotho
portion of the sample consisted of 1,023 households. Data was collected
on household attributes as well as the characteristics of individual household members, both migrants and non-migrants. Information was gathered on a total of 1,076 migrants of whom 899 were male and 177 were
female.
Only migrant-sending households were included in the survey.
Migrants ‘away’ in South Africa (or other countries) were not themselves
interviewed. Instead, data on their migration and remittance practices
and demographic characteristics was obtained from household members in Lesotho. Furthermore, the households captured in the data set
were those reporting members working outside the country, and thus
excluded either migrants who were not working or migrants who had not
left household members behind in their home countries. The data thus
reflects the situation for economic migrants: people who live away from
home for reasons related to their employment or occupation.
In order to explore remittance behaviour and its impact in greater
depth, individual and focus group case-study research was conducted in
Lesotho. All interviews, including those with migrants, were conducted
in Lesotho because of the difficulties of identifying a sufficient number of
migrants within South Africa and the fact that migrants would be more
likely to give honest answers when at home than if they were interviewed
in a foreign country where many work illegally. Most migrants come
home for the festive season in December, which meant there were no
problems in identifying interviewees.
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A semi-structured questionnaire was prepared to provide basic
data on household demography, income, and remittance information.
Respondents were then asked to elaborate on their perceptions of the
importance of migration, household decision-making on migration and
the impact of migration to South Africa on the household and the community. Five focus groups were conducted (two with migrants, two with
remittance receivers and one with remittance-based entrepreneurs). All
interviews were conducted in Sesotho and transcribed and translated
into English for analysis.

Past Migrations

O

ver the course of the twentieth century, the people of
Lesotho became deeply reliant on migration to South
Africa.10 An extensive research literature in the 1970s and
1980s showed that circular migration between Lesotho and
South Africa had an impact on all aspects of Basotho economic, social
and cultural life: dividing families, weakening domestic social structure
and organization, undermining agricultural production and productivity,
compromising health, exacerbating rural poverty and intensifying gender inequality.11 Migration was consistently seen as having a relentlessly
negative impact on development, an interpretation of the migrationdevelopment relationship that persists to the present. Lesotho was once
the “granary” of Southern Africa, the home of a productive agricultural
peasantry producing crops for export but was reduced over time to an
impoverished labour reserve for South African industry. The central
question for these researchers was not “Why are the Basotho still poor?”
but rather “How have the Basotho become poor?”12
The historical and contemporary dependence of households in
Lesotho on migration to South Africa was recently described by Turner as
follows:
For generations, Basotho livelihood aspirations have focused
on wage employment. For most of this time, the country’s
role as a regional labour reserve meant that most of this
wage employment was across the border in South Africa.
To have at least one wage earner in the family is seen as
the foundation of livelihood security, both through current
wage income and through future activities. These future
activities (notably farming) can be built from the assets that
wages may buy, and may continue long after wage earning
has ceased. Poverty threatens households that are unable to
break into wage employment, or that lose such employment
permanently.13
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The inter-generational character of migration from Lesotho to South
Africa was corroborated by the MARS, which found that 76% of Basotho
respondents (household heads or their partners) had parents and at least
25% had grandparents who had worked in South Africa. This compared
to a regional average of 57% and 23% (Table 1).
Table 1: Migration Experience of Parents and Grandparents
Lesotho

Region*

Parent Worked in Another Country (%)
Yes

76.2

57.1

No

15.7

34.7

Don’t Know

8.1

8.2

100.0

100.0

Yes

24.4

22.6

No

21.1

43.3

Grandparent Worked in Another Country (%)

Don’t Know
Total

54.5

34.2

100.0

100.0

Source: SAMP Household Survey
* Includes Botswana, Lesotho, Mozambique, Swaziland, Zimbabwe

During the twentieth century, the major form of legal movement
between Lesotho and South Africa was contract migration for work
on the South African gold mines. Lesotho (along with Malawi and
Mozambique) became a major supply source for the mines.14 The number
of migrants increased over time and reached nearly 130,000 at the peak
in 1990 (Table 2). Almost 50% of households in Lesotho had at least one
household member working as a migrant on the South African mines in
the late 1970s. Migrants signed contracts of up to a year in length and
spent a good part of their working lives away from home. Most migrants
were young, single men who aimed to return permanently to Lesotho
once they had accumulated sufficient stock and savings to marry and
establish their own household. Their sons, when old enough, would take
their place on the mines.
Mine work is extremely demanding both physically and mentally.15
Not all men were suited to, or capable of, working underground. Some
therefore migrated to South Africa to work in other sectors such as manufacturing and construction. But mining overshadowed all other forms
of migrant employment. In 1975, for example, 81% of migrants worked
in mining, 7.5% were in manufacturing, 5% in domestic work (mainly
women), 3% in construction, 2% in government and 1% in agriculture.16
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Table 2: Migration of Miners from Lesotho to South Africa, 1920-2005
Year

Average No. Employed

Actual No. of Recruits (Est.)

1920

10,439

15,000

1925

14,256

20,000

1930

22,306

30,000

1935

34,778

36,000

1940

52,044

55,000

1945

36,414

36,000

1950

34,467

35,000

1955

36,332

38,000

1960

48,842

53,000

1965

54,819

57,000

1970

63,998

70,000

1975

78,114

83,000

1980

96,309

100,000

1985

97,639

100,000

1990

99,707

127,000

1995

87,935

97,000

2000

58,224

64,000

2005

46,069

48,000

Source: TEBA

During the apartheid era, Basotho miners were not allowed by South
African law to stay in the country beyond the length of their contracts
and they could not bring their spouses or families with them. At work
they lived in regimented single-sex barracks known as compounds or
hostels. They sent home a significant proportion of their wages as remittances, but still not enough in the view of the post-colonial Lesotho government. In 1974, the government therefore passed the Lesotho Deferred
Pay Act (Act No. 18), which established a compulsory remittance 
system.17
In the stereotypical view, men migrated to work on the South African
mines and women were forced to remain behind to tend the fields and
raise the family.18 This was certainly the experience of many women
but by no means all. Female migration to South Africa was never as
voluminous as male migration, but nor was it entirely absent. From the
early twentieth century, female migrants from Lesotho were usually
young women or widows escaping poverty at home.19 The decision to
migrate was often taken out of desperation. As Murray observed in 1981:
“Despite the degrading conditions, social isolation and risk of arrest …
women go because they have no alternative.”20 In South Africa, they
were highly marginalized in the labour market and often confined to
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domestic service or to illegal informal sector activity including brewing
and sex work.
The ability of Basotho women (and non-mine male migrants) to seek
work in South Africa was curtailed by the South African Aliens Control
Act of 1963. Prior to that time, migrants from Lesotho could cross freely
and work in South Africa. After 1963, passports, residence and work
permits were required. Legal employment in South Africa became very
difficult for Basotho women. Only the South African mining companies
were exempted from the legislation. The number of female migrants from
Lesotho in South Africa fell quickly during the 1960s.

Changing Patterns of Migration Since 1990
Since 1990, there have been major shifts in the nature of migration from
Lesotho to South Africa. The most significant changes include:
• Greatly increased cross-border movement between Lesotho and
South Africa
• Declining employment opportunities for Basotho men in the
South African gold mines
• Increased female migration from Lesotho
• Growing internal female migration of young women within
Lesotho
• Increases in skilled migration from Lesotho
• Growth of AIDS-related migration in Lesotho

Increased Cross-Border Movement
The number of people crossing the border legally through the official border posts between Lesotho and South Africa increased dramatically after
1990, rising from 240,000 in 1991 to over 2 million in 2007. Lesotho is
easily the most important source of African entrants into South Africa,
sending a quarter or more of the total since the early 1990s (Table 3;
Figure 1).21
Not all of those who cross from Lesotho to South Africa are migrants
going to work or to engage in income-generating activity. In the late
1990s, SAMP asked a nationally representative sample of adults in
Lesotho the reason for their most recent visit to South Africa. By far the
majority (34%) had gone to visit family or friends. Another 19% had
gone to shop. Only 17% had gone to work, with another 8% to look for
work. Other reasons included medical treatment (6%), trading (3%),
tourism (2%), business (2%) and study (1%).22 In other words, only a
quarter of cross-border movements were employment-related.

10
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Table 3: Legal Migration from Lesotho to South Africa, 1991-2009
Year

Africa

Lesotho

% Lesotho

1991

1,193,743

243,710

20.4

1992

2,327,959

887,811

38.1

1993

2,700,415

1,038,479

38.5

1994

3,125,959

1,184,893

37.9

1995

3,452,164

1,097,351

31.8

1996

3,781,351

1,189,129

31.4

1997

3,665,003

1,190,848

32.5

1998

4,291,547

1,649,511

38.4

1999

4,353,259

1,588,365

36.5

2000

4,298,613

1,559,422

36.3

2001

4,193,732

1,288,160

30.7

2002

4, 513,694

1,162,786

25.8

2003

4,519,616

1,291,242

28.6

2004

4,707,384

1,479,802

31.4

2005

5,446,062

1,668,826

30.6

2006

6,308,636

1,919,889

30.4

2007

6,902,041

2,171,954

31.5

2008

7,395,414

2,165,505

29.3

fig 1.pdf

1

18/05/2010

Source: Statistics South Africa

2:21 PM

Figure 1: Legal Migration from Lesotho to South Africa, 1991-2009
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The hyper-mobility of the population of contemporary Lesotho, and
the complex connections between internal and international migration,
are captured in the following description:
11
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The Basotho are integrated together in a fluid shifting
ensemble of people, where members of the same family may have a relative managing sheep and goats in the
upper Senqu Valley in Lesotho, while his brother cultivates
mountain wheat and keeps a home ready for the herdsman
when he comes down for the winter. They have a sister who
has married in the lowlands, where she struggles to grow
maize on an exhausted piece of eroded land. Her husband
is fortunate to work in the South African mines, and comes
home monthly. When he was younger he brought cattle
back home from the mines, but now as he has grown older
he prefers to bring money and household goods. The sheep
and goat herder in the mountain has a cousin who teaches
school in a peri-urban community near Mafeteng and
another cousin who works in a textile factory in Maputsoe.
She married a policeman in Bloemfontein, South Africa, and
is waiting until he finds a place for both of them so she can
move there. A distant uncle in Bloemfontein who took permanent residence in South Africa when he retired from the
mines is helping them find a place to live. All of these folk
visit each other regularly, so that there is a constant flow
from mountain to lowland to town to South African city
and back.23

Declining Mine Migration
During the 1990s, a stagnant gold price led to a major period of declining
production, mine closures and retrenchments in South Africa’s low-grade
gold mines.24 In 1990, there were around 376,000 migrant miners in the
industry. By 2004, there were only 230,000: a total job loss of 140,000.
Of those who were left, around 50,000 (about a sixth) were from Lesotho
(Table 4). Between 1995 and 2006, the proportion of Basotho miners in
the total workforce fell from 30% to 17%.
The impact of retrenchments on so many migration-dependent
households in Lesotho was devastating.25 When 50,000 miners lost their
jobs, almost as many households lost their main source of income. The
proportion of households in Lesotho with at least one household member
working as a migrant on the South African mines declined to only 12%
in 2002 from 50% twenty years earlier.26 Young male school-leavers could
no longer rely on migration to the South African gold mines for employment, as they had for decades. Mine employment became an elusive goal
for men: “What used to be the absolute economic backbone of Basotho
villages and rural economies has been degraded into the privilege of a
few.”27
12
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After 2001, the increase in the gold price halted the dramatic decline
of the South African gold industry and employment levels increased once
again.28 However, the number of migrant miners from Lesotho continued
to fall (from 58,000 in 2000 to 46,000 in 2006) (Table 4). Under pressure
from the South African government to employ more locals, the mining
companies met their needs by hiring internal migrants from within South
Africa. According to the National Union of Mineworkers, no new workers (‘novices’) have been recruited from Lesotho since 2002.29
Table 4: Mine Jobs in South Africa for Basotho Migrants (Average No. Employed)
Year

Basotho Workers

Total Workers

% Basotho

1990

99,707

376,473

26.5

1991

93,897

354,649

26.5

1992

93,519

339,485

27.5

1993

89,940

317,456

28.3

1994

89,237

315,264

28.3

1995

87,935

291,902

30.1

1996

81,357

284,050

28.6

1997

76,361

262,748

29.1

1998

60,450

228,071

26.5

1999

52,188

213,832

24.4

2000

58,224

230,687

25.2

2001

49,483

207,547

23.8

2002

54,157

234,991

23.0

2003

54,479

234,027

23.3

2004

48,962

230,771

21.2

2005

46,049

236,459

19.5

2006

46,082

267,894

17.2

Source: TEBA

The absence of "new blood" is reflected in the age profile of Basotho
miners. In 2005, MARS found that less than 3% of miners were under
the age of 25 and less than 11% were under 30 (Table 5). Over half of
the miners were over the age of 40 and 20% were over the age of 50.
Nearly 70% of the miners had over 10 years experience working on the
gold mines and around 30% had more than 20 years experience. This
represents a major shift from the past: historically, the majority of miners
were in their twenties and thirties and expected to retire from this backbreaking work once they were in their forties and their adult sons could
take their place.

13
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Table 5: Age of Migrant Miners
Age Group

No.

%

20-24

26

2.8

25-29

73

7.9

30-34

106

11.5

35-39

187

20.3

40-44

176

19.1

45-49

162

17.6

50-54

116

12.6

55-59

47

5.1

60-64

20

2.3

>65
Total

7

0.8

920

100.0

Source: SAMP Household Survey

The decline in gold mine employment has had two spin-off impacts on
migration from Lesotho: (a) a diversification in patterns of labour migration as new migrants seek out other employment opportunities in postapartheid South Africa and (b) an increase in female migration to South
Africa as female household members replace retrenched males and seek
employment opportunities in sectors that prefer female employees (such as
domestic service and commercial farming).30

Feminization of Migration
The growing "feminization" of migration from Lesotho has meant (a) an
increase in the absolute number of female migrants; (b) an increase in
the proportion of migrants who are female; and (c) a qualitative change
in the character of female migration. The reasons why more women are
migrating include, first, the collapse of apartheid, which made it easier
to migrate and to find work without being constantly harassed and
deported. Secondly, as one Focus Group participant noted, remaining in
Lesotho makes no economic sense:
More women are migrating to South Africa because of
the difficulties they experience in life and also because the
jobs in South Africa offer more money when compared to
what we get in Lesotho for the same work we do in South
Africa. For domestic work in Lesotho, a woman gets M250
per month whereas in South Africa the minimum they get
would be M900.31
Once in South Africa, women gravitate to Gauteng because wages
there are higher for the same job than they are in nearby Free State
14
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towns.32 The “difficulties” cited as reasons for migration include poverty,
hunger, landlessness, unemployment, widowhood or abandonment, supporting AIDS orphans, and no money for school fees, medical treatment
or clothing.
Migration within Southern Africa is still male-dominated (Table 6).
This is true even in Lesotho, which has seen drastic shrinkage of male
migrant labour to the mines. Female migrants from Lesotho make up a
higher proportion of the total than in either Swaziland or Mozambique,
the two countries with which it can meaningfully be compared.
Table 6: Sex of Migrants
Country

Male (%)

Lesotho

83.6

16.4

Mozambique

93.6

6.2

Swaziland

92.4

7.6

Zimbabwe

56.4

43.6

Total

84.5

15.5

3,972

731

N

Female (%)

Source: SAMP Household Survey

Data from several national household surveys between 1990 and
2004, conducted by Sechaba Consultants, provide a general “snapshot”
of gender trends at the aggregate level. Table 7 gives the percentage of
household members aged 16 and over who were at home, living away
from home in Lesotho, and living in South Africa at the time of the particular survey.
Table 7: Geographical Location of Total Adult Population, 1990-2004
Year

In home community
Subsistence

Elsewhere in Lesotho

Other

Working

Outside Lesotho

Other

Mining

Other

M%

F%

M%

F%

M%

F%

M%

F%

M%

F%

M%

F%

1990

15

33

17

14

2

1

2

2

11

0

2

1

1993

12

32

20

16

2

2

2

2

9

0

2

2

1999

14

29

23

13

2

2

2

2

4

0

3

2

2004

19

29

17

17

2

3

1

2

3

0

3

3

Source: Sechaba Consultants

In 2004, compared to the early 1990s, the proportion of adults who
were at home increased (from 32% to 36%) while women decreased
fractionally (47% to 46%). The proportion who were men involved in
subsistence activities at home increased (from 15% to 19%) and those
who were women decreased (from 33% to 29%). The proportion of men
15
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fig 2.pdf

who were away from home but still in Lesotho declined from 4% to 3%
(although the proportion actually working remained virtually steady at
2%). The proportion who were women away from home increased from
4% to 8% (and those working from 2% to 6%). International migration
trends show a marked decline in male migration (from 13% to 6% of
the population) and increase in female migration (from 1% to 3%). The
male decrease is particularly marked in the case of mine migrants (from
11% to 3%). Thus, while male migration flows out of the country are still
larger than female, the gap has been closing.
The recent feminization in migration from Lesotho is indicated by the
fact that nearly 60% of female migrants have less than five years migratory experience (compared with 29% of men) (Figure 2). Over 80% of
women have been migrating for ten years or less. At the other end of the
scale,
a quarter of
male
1
18/05/2010
2:15
PM migrants have over 20 years migration experience
(compared to only 6.8% of female migrants).

Figure 2: Length of Experience as Migrant Worker (%)
70 –
60 –

Male
Female

50 –
40 –
30 –
20 –
10 –
0–
1–5
years

6–10
years

11–15
years

16–20
years

21–25
years

26–30
years

31 or
more years

Don’t
know

MARS found a much less significant gender difference in the age of
migrants (Table 8). The ‘middle’ age cohort of 25 to 39 contains the most
migrants amongst women, while for men it is the older, 40-59 range. The
proportion of female migrants falling into the younger 15-24 age bracket
is also higher than the equivalent proportion for males. However, the differences are not large. For both men and women, migration now appears
to be practised at all stages of the life course, rather than as a temporary
measure at a young age, as in the past. The presence of female migrants
across the full age range is also consistent with the large numbers of
16
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female migrants from Lesotho whose marital status is widowed or separated, and who therefore depend on their own migration for their livelihood.
Table 8: Age of Migrants
Age Group

Males (%)

Females (%)

15 to 24

5.4

9.7

25 to 39

41.6

41.3

40 to 59

47.3

37.2

3.1

4.1

60 and over
Don’t know

2.6

7.7

Total

100

100

N

934

196

Source: SAMP Household Survey

Gender differences in migration from Lesotho are clearly shaped by
household structure and roles. Overall, the household survey showed
that male migrants are most likely to be in the ‘married’ category, while
female migrants are for the most part without husbands, either because
they have not yet or never married, or because their husbands have left
them or died (Table 9). A much higher proportion of female migrants are
unmarried compared to their male counterparts: 25% of female migrants
compared to just below 10% of male migrants. This suggests that some
women, whether by choice or necessity, are selecting migration over marriage as their primary means of economic support, or at least are delaying marriage until later in life. Among male migrants, 84% are married,
whereas the equivalent figure for female migrants is only just above a
quarter (with 48% once married).
Table 9: Marital Status of Migrants
Marital Status

Males (%)

Unmarried

9.7

25.0

84.2

26.5

0.3

0.5

0

4.6

Separated

1.7

15.3

Abandoned

0.2

3.6

Married
Cohabiting
Divorced

Females (%)

Widowed

3.9

24.5

Total

100

100

N

934

196

Source: SAMP Household Survey

17
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Another important finding is the high proportion of female migrants
giving their position in the family as ‘daughter.’ Over 50% of female
migrants are younger members of households; either daughters, daughters-in-law or nieces compared to only 22% of male migrants who are
sons, sons-in-law or nephews. This confirms the new post-1990 trend,
where young women are engaging in economic migration practices once
associated mainly with young men.
As significant are the differences between male and female migrants
in levels of separation, divorce, abandonment and widowhood. Almost
half of the female migrants from Lesotho fall into these categories, compared to only around 6% of the male migrants. This suggests that marital
breakdown or loss of a husband act as significant drivers of female migration. Whatever the circumstances leading to the loss of a male partner,
these women are often the primary or sole breadwinners for their families
in what have become female-headed households. One widow described
how her daughter’s separation had forced her to migrate:
My daughter was married, but is now separated. She had to
migrate due to problems in her household. Her husband was
not prepared to settle the dispute they had. Their children
were dying of hunger and she asked me permission to leave.
I see her migration as helping me because I no longer have
means. She is really helping me. Things were getting tough
for me. The going would be very tough without the money.
Being that little, I can only use it for a few things.33
Her daughter has been working for three years as a domestic worker
in South Africa where she earns around R10,000 a year, remitting about
R3,000 back to her mother and two children who stay with the mother.
The incidence of female widowhood, divorce and separation in the
Lesotho sample was not only higher than for men, but also dramatically
higher than the levels reported for female migrants in any of the other
countries surveyed. The fact that the unmarried, married, widowed and
divorced/separated/abandoned categories each contained roughly equivalent proportions of the total number of female migrants from Lesotho is
of fundamental importance in understanding the nature and impact of
female migrants’ remittances, including who receives their remittances
and how those remittances are spent.
The high incidence of widowhood and separation is further reflected
in the proportion of women migrants (24%) who are heads of households
(Table 10). This reinforces the suggestion that female migration and
female household headship are causally linked. The absence of a male
household head appears to encourage female migration, whether because
of the lack of local livelihood or employment options for women, or due
18
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to the absence of patriarchal restriction on women’s migration by a male
spouse.
Table 10: Relationship of Migrants to Household Head
Relation
Head
Spouse/partner

Males (%)

Females (%)

76.5

24.0

0.1

18.4

Son/daughter

21.8

45.4

Father/mother

0.0

1.0

Brother/sister

0.5

1.5

Grandchild

0.4

1.5

Grandparent

0.0

0.0

Son/daughter-in-law

0.1

5.1

Nephew/niece

0.0

0.5

Other relative

0.6

2.6

Non-relative

0.0

0.0

Total

100

100

N

934

196

Source: SAMP Household Survey

In the past, most male migrants were young single men. As many as
three-quarters of male migrants are now household heads compared to
25% of female migrants. While the female figure is much lower, it does
indicate that a sizable group of women not only have the responsibility of
being the head of their own household but must also migrate out of the
country to ensure the survival of the household.
Becoming ‘South African’

I am a single mother with two sons aged 18 and 7 in Lesotho.
Both of my parents are dead and I decided to go to work in South
Africa to earn money to feed my sons and to put my children
through school. I have been migrating to South Africa for nine
years and I spend eleven months away at a time. While I am
away my two sons look after themselves. It is not a good thing
as my children remain here alone when I am at work and that I
don’t like at all. I earn R14,000 a year as a domestic and I send
my sons around R6,000 a year because I don’t pay transport, rent
or buy food at work.
The money is still better than it was in the (textile) factories
and the working conditions are good. I send the money home
through a bank. My older son gets the money from the bank in
19
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Lesotho and the two boys use the money for food, rent, clothing
and school fees.
I make a little extra through membership of a stokvel (money
company). I contribute R150 a month. The stokvel loans out
money to its members and to others. The capital and profits are
divided between the members at the end of the year to buy groceries for Christmas holidays.
I have a South African passport so I do not need to return to
Lesotho to renew a permit. I am also treated well unlike how they
treat other Africans from other countries. I no longer even use
my Lesotho passport. I will keep going to South Africa as long
as there is work. However, I am also thinking of going to South
Africa with my two children. I have more benefits available to
me as a South African citizen and it would also be easier for me
to have my own house.

Expansion of Internal Female Migration
Female migration to South Africa would be even more voluminous if it
was not for the dramatic growth in local employment opportunities in
Lesotho’s textile industry. The industry started in the late 1980s when
Asian (primarily Taiwanese) investors relocated from South Africa to
Lesotho to avoid sanctions on South Africa and to access the European
market under the Lome Convention.34 In the 1990s, the industry continued to grow as new overseas markets were developed to take advantage
of Lesotho’s unmet quotas under the Multifiber Arrangement (MFA) of
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. The industry was stimulated after 2000 by Lesotho’s privileged status as a duty-free exporter
to the US under that country’s Africa Growth and Opportunities Act
(AGOA).35 The Act gave Lesotho-based textile producers privileged
access to the US garment market. Lesotho could also import fabrics from
Asia under AGOA for use in garment manufacture. Between 2000 and
2004, textile exports more than doubled, the number of factories rose to
47 and the workforce to 50,000. Virtually all of the factories were foreign-owned, the majority by Taiwanese investors. Over 90% of exports
went to the US.
The phasing out of quotas maintained under the WTO Agreement
on Textile and Clothing in January 2005 caused a crisis in the Lesotho
industry. Exports fell, factories shut down as their owners (no longer
constrained by quota restrictions) relocated to Asia, and thousands
of jobs were lost (an estimated 15,000 in 2005-6 alone). The Lesotho
20
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fig

Government responded by granting further concessions to producers
and securing “ethical buying” contracts with major US buyers such as
The Gap, Walmart and Levi Strauss.36 By mid-2006, the industry had
rebounded with factories re-opening and employment levels once again
reaching almost 50,000. The changing fortunes of the industry are evident in production figures for the period 1992 to 2005 (Figure 3).
From the beginning, the textile companies preferred female to male
labour.37 Female workers are considered more "docile" and "nimble" by
employers. They are certainly ultra-exploitable.38 Today, over 90% of
Basotho employed in textile factories are young women, most of whom
are internal migrants. The numbers have risen even as the number
of male mineworkers has fallen, leading some to characterize Basotho
female textile workers as the ‘new miners’ (Figure 4).39 However, the
emerging employment opportunities for young women "have come to a
group which is structurally different from that of men, the ‘traditional’
breadwinners and wage earners.”40
In many households, young women have displaced young men as the
primary wage earners.41 However, there is a large difference in salary
between male miners and female garment workers. In 2002, for example,
miners earned an average of M2,900 per month, while garment workers received only M650 per month. The situation was even worse in
2006, when miners were receiving a substantially higher wage of M4,500
a month, while the garment workers’ salaries had not changed. The
demand
for
employment
in the textile factories far outstrips the supply,
3.pdf
1
18/05/2010
2:24 PM
providing no incentive to employers to raise wages.42

Figure 3: Textile Production in Lesotho
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Figure 4: Employment in South African Mines and Lesotho Garment Factories, 1990-2006
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Despite low per capita wages, M225 million was paid to Basotho
workers by textile manufacturers in 2002.43 This doubled to M449 million in 2004.44 One study claims that “very little is remitted to the family
or household.”45 However, a survey of textile workers conducted in 2001 
concluded that there is a “significant transfer” of remittances to the poorer areas of Lesotho from which many of the workers come.46 The average
per capita remittance was M139 per month, a total of M50 million per
annum. At the time, therefore, these female workers were voluntarily
remitting nearly 25% of their earnings to their rural households.

Brain Drain to South Africa
After 1990, many skilled Basotho anticipated being able to migrate relatively freely to South Africa for work. This did not happen in the numbers predicted because of South Africa’s restrictionist attitude towards
all forms of skilled immigration after 1994.47 Those who did get work
permits in South Africa were either exceptionally skilled or had relatives
through whom they obtained identity documents (ID’s) and residence
permits. They were also able to take advantage of the deracialization of
the South African workforce and affirmative action programmes: “They
have been helped by the fact that Sesotho is an official language of South
Africa and many Basotho have been eligible for South African citizenship
but it means that Lesotho has often lost many of her most skilled citizens.”48 In the MARS study, around 10% of migrants from Lesotho were
found to be working in skilled occupations in South Africa (Table 11).
With the exception of supervisory and skilled manual work (primarily
mine jobs), the proportion of female migrants in every category (includ22
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ing office work, teaching and health work) was higher than that of male
migrants.
Table 11: Skilled Migrant Occupations in South Africa
Males %

Females %

Total %

Managerial office worker

0.1

0.5

0.2

Office worker

0.2

0.5

0.3

Supervisor

0.1

0.0

0.1

Skilled manual worker

7.4

4.6

6.2

Professional worker

2.8

4.6

2.9

Teacher

0.1

0.5

0.1

Health worker

0.0

1.5

0.3

10.7

12.5

10.1

Total
Source: SAMP Household Survey

South Africa’s 2002 Immigration Act has made it easier for skilled
migrants to work in South Africa and the numbers of skilled Basotho
working in South Africa has risen accordingly. This brain drain to South
Africa is very likely to accelerate in the future.49 A SAMP survey of final
year students in Lesotho’s technical colleges and the National University
of Lesotho showed that interest in leaving Lesotho, either temporarily or
permanently, is very high.50 Nearly a third of the students (31%) believed
they would end up working in South Africa. Other destinations mentioned included Botswana (25%), the United Kingdom (10%), Europe
(9%) and the USA (7%).

HIV/AIDS and Migration
There is a significant body of research in Southern Africa that identifies
population mobility as one of the major reasons for the rapid transmission
of the disease throughout the region.51 Certainly, its spread in Lesotho in
the 1990s cannot be explained without taking account of the extraordinary mobility of the population.52 The spread of HIV and AIDS has not
simply been fuelled by migration. Migration, by its very nature, facilitates
high-risk behaviour and makes migrants more vulnerable to HIV infection.
The first identified case of HIV infection in Lesotho was in 1986.
Initially, growth in HIV prevalence was slow, only reaching 0.04% in
1990. For the next eight years, the rise was rapid, climbing from an estimated 1.0% in 1991 to 30.5% in 1998 and to 37% in 2008. Data from
antenatal clinics show a rise in prevalence amongst pregnant women in
the country’s main city, Maseru, from 5.5% in 1991 to 42.2% in 2000.53
The Lesotho Behavioural Surveillance Survey (2002) conducted 
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interviews with miners, taxi-drivers and assistants, soldiers, low-income
migrant women (working in Lesotho, mainly in the textile industry)
and female sex workers.54 Despite widespread knowledge of the causes
and prognosis for those with HIV and AIDS, rates of non-regular and
multi-partner sex were high amongst all groups, not just sex workers.55
Condom use was low and sporadic amongst all of these groups of internal
and international migrants. A study of the environs of ten border posts
between South Africa and Lesotho identified them as sites of “profound
risk” where commercial sex is widely available.56 As the study concludes:
“There is exceptional HIV vulnerability at each of the sites investigated,
a sociocultural context of casual and commercial sex exacerbated by
profound mobility (of) truckers, bus and taxi drivers, traders, soldiers,
migrant labourers and transient workers.”57
On the mines, a culture of macho male sexuality and the availability
of commercial sex (often with female migrant sex workers) led to the
rapid diffusion of HIV amongst the mine workforce in the 1990s.58 The
introduction of HIV to Lesotho is widely attributed to returning migrant
miners infected with the virus while at work: migrant labour to the mines
“readily transplants HIV risk from the mining camps to rural Lesotho.”59
Migration, which separates and divides couples for extended periods of
time, and accompanying poverty, play a complex but significant role in
the sexual behaviour and preferences of migrants and their partners while
apart.60 The death of either partner has profound consequences, as one
Focus Group participant observed:
Let us look at it this way. Some men do not come home
when they are in South Africa. We may not know the reasons but many die there and their spouses are forced to go
and look for jobs in South Africa. While many women go
to South Africa because of problems in their households the
risk is, when they fail to get those jobs, they get into sexual
relations with many men from the mines. They switch into
prostitution and what then happens is that they contract
HIV/AIDS. They would be looking for let us say R20 from
each man and in this way, each woman would be looking
for five or more men to get R100. The intention is to send
money back home to the children and leaving something for
herself to eat. The result of all this is the man dies and she is
also going to die.61
The 2004 Lesotho Demographic and Health Survey tested blood
samples from throughout the country and found: (a) prevalence rates
were higher for all ages for women than men (b) the peak age range for
infection was 30-34 for men and 35-39 for women; (c) after age 40 rates
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fig 5.pdf

decline with age.62 Although urban prevalence is higher than rural for
1
18/05/2010
3:05 PM
both
men
and women,
rural prevalence is still significant (33% versus
24% for women, 22% versus 18.5% for men) (Figure 5, Table 12).

Figure 5: HIV Prevalence Amongst Women at Antenatal Clinics (%)
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Table 12: National HIV/AIDS Prevalence by Gender, Age and Spatial Distribution
Age

Men

Total

15-19

Women
7.9

2.3

5.3

20-24

24.2

12.2

19.5

25-29

39.8

23.9

33.3

30-34

39.3

41.1

40.0

35-39

43.3

39.1

41.8

40-44

29.1

33.9

30.6

45-49

16.8

26.2

20.0

Urban

33.0

22.0

29.1

Rural

24.3

18.5

21.9

Lowlands

28.0

20.4

24.9

Foothills

24.2

16.9

21.2

Mountains

23.3

17.6

21.0

Source: Government of Lesotho

HIV/AIDS is also generating new forms of migration. There is evidence that once migrants become too sick to work, they return home
permanently.63 The loss of income for the family is often devastating
when a migrant becomes too sick to earn and remit. The impact is exacerbated by the fact that the burden and cost of care is also borne by the
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family. The other form of migration on the increase is children’s migration as orphans are sent to live with extended family members in different parts of the country or in South Africa.64 The HIV/AIDS epidemic
has left many farmers unable to do the hard physical labour required
to work the land and many migrants without the physical energy or
resources to continue to migrate for work. As Turner notes: “There is no
doubt that the pandemic will exacerbate poverty as the nation’s aggregate
capacity to farm is reduced by sickness and death.”65
HIV/AIDS has a number of implications for households in Lesotho
including:
• Increased household dependency ratios. Chronic illness and
death in the working age population are increasing the ratio of
dependent consumers to producers in the household;
• Changes in household headship. The death of male household
heads is increasing the number of widows and female-headed
households;
• Incomplete Households. One parent or one whole generation is
missing;
• Households with Additional Orphans. Orphans are the responsibility of the next of kin;
• Orphan-Headed Households. These are apparently not as common in Lesotho as elsewhere but are likely to increase in number;
• Defunct Households. When both parents die, there are no resident adults and the children are dispersed to live with relatives.66
All of these changes in household structure, division of labour and
livelihood strategies are increasing the economic vulnerability of households. Households that experience the death of a migrant from HIV and
AIDS generally experience increased poverty.

Migrant Destinations
Purpose of Journey

M

igrants from Lesotho go almost entirely to South Africa.
MARS found that 99.8% of Basotho migrants work in
South Africa and the remainder are in Botswana. South
Africa not only has the strongest and most diverse economy
in the region, providing a variety of employment and livelihood opportunities, it is also by far the largest and most affluent market for migrants
with commodities to sell. In addition, it has the greatest variety of goods
for purchase, consumption or trade. The long tradition of labour migration, together with linguistic and cultural traits shared with the South
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African population, makes it an accessible and familiar destination.
Why people go to South Africa from Lesotho has a very clear influence on where they go. For example, the majority of people going to purchase goods for their own consumption or trade go to the South African
border towns of Ladybrand, Ficksburg and Thaba Nchu/Botsabelo (Table
13). Bloemfontein, the nearest large South African city, is also a popular
destination. The primary destinations for those going to work are the
mining towns of Welkom and Virginia (24% of all Basotho going to these
towns go there to work), Johannesburg (16%) and Bethlehem (14%).
Other smaller towns scattered around the Free State and Gauteng
Provinces also attract migrants going to work. Those running their own
business (mainly informal sector traders) make up 40% of Basotho visitors to Cape Town and 21% of visitors to Johannesburg.
Table 13: South African Destinations by Purpose of Journey
Shopping

Own
business

Bethelehem

21.4

35.7

Bloemfontein

25.4

20.9

Cape Town

40.0

-

Durban

-

50.0

Ficksburg

48.5

22.4

6.0

Johannesburg

2.3

20.9

41.9

Ladybrand

60.6

18.9

8.7

Pietermaritzburg

-

-

100

-

-

Pretoria

-

10.0

10.0

30.0

50.0

14.3

28.6

14.3

14.3

Thaba Nchu

31.6

5.3

26.3

10.5

5.3

5.3

Welkom

1.4

16.9

25.4

15.5

4.2

23.9

Wepener

-

-

100

-

-

Other FS

6.5

35.5

12.9

9.7

6.5

19.4

9.7

100

Other Gauteng

1.1

19.5

27.6

4.6

3.4

20.7

9.2

13.8

100

Other RSA

3.1

18.8

37.5

21.9

6.3

12.5

-

-

100

Outside RSA

33.3

Harrismith

-

Leisure
-

Employer’s
business

Education

Work

Medical
Services

Other

Total

14.3

-

7.2

100

6.0

2.9

100

14.3

7.1

9.0

17.9

-

20.0

40.0

-

50.0

-

-

-

2.4

0.2

5.2

3.7

7.0

2.3

16.3

-

9.3

100

6.3

0.8

-

3.9

0.8

100

17.9

33.3

-

33.4

-

-

-

14.3

-

-

4.2

-

100

11.6

100

-

100
100

14.4

100

15.7

100

8.5

100

-

-

100

-

100

-

100

Source: SAMP Household Survey

Overall, minework is still the profession of the majority of male
Basotho migrants. The dominant employment sector for female migrants
is domestic service (with 50% of female migrants). Overall, women are
employed in a wider variety of jobs and sectors than men although no
other sector employs more than 10% of female migrants. Another 
significant difference between male and female migrants lies in selfemployment. Only 3% of male migrants but 16% of female migrants are
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informal sector producers or traders and hawkers. A greater proportion
of women migrants also described themselves as self-employed business
persons. Finally, while there are proportionally more skilled manual workers who are male, women have a stronger presence than men in most
skilled categories including office work, professional work, teaching and
the health sector.

South African Gold Mines
Migrant miners still make up 80% of male migrants to South Africa
(Table 14). Mineworkers are recruited (rehired) annually in Lesotho
on contract by the mine labour agency TEBA. Before 2002, they were
employed under a bilateral agreement between the two governments that
dated back to the 1970s. Since the 2002 South Africa Immigration Act
came into force, mining companies apply for corporate permits that allow
them to employ a certain number of migrants from Lesotho.  
Table 14: Migrant Occupations in South Africa
Main occupation

Males %

Females %

Total %

Farmer

0.1

1.0

0.3

Agricultural worker

1.4

4.6

2.0

Service worker

0.7

3.1

1.1

Domestic worker

0.4

50.0

9.0

Managerial office worker

0.1

0.5

0.2

Office worker

0.2

0.5

0.3

Supervisor

0.1

0.0

0.1

79.8

0.2

68.4

Skilled manual worker

7.4

4.6

6.2

Unskilled manual worker

1.6

2.0

1.5

Informal sector producer

2.1

8.7

2.8

Trader/ hawker/ vendor

1.0

7.1

2.0

Security personnel

0.2

0.0

0.2

Business (self-employed)

0.4

5.6

1.2

Professional worker

2.8

4.6

2.9

Teacher

0.1

0.5

0.1

Health worker

0.0

1.5

0.3

Pensioner

0.1

0.0

0.1

Shepherd

0.6

0.0

0.5

Don’t know

0.7

3.1

1.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

Mine worker

Total
Source: SAMP Household Survey
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The majority of today’s migrant miners have many years of experience
working on the mines. The survey showed that 90% are married and 85%
are household heads. The remainder are sons of the household (some
married, some unmarried).
Working conditions in the South African mining industry have been
examined in depth in a number of studies.67 Pay is low although the
average wage increased from R12,000 per annum in 1992 to R53,000
in 2007. Two thirds of miners spend 11 months of the year away from
Lesotho. Working conditions remain extremely dangerous and death and
disability are a constant threat. Extensive sub-contracting has led to a
deterioration in the working conditions and standards at many mines.68
Migrants are still compelled to defer up to a third of their wages to
Lesotho. Illegal gold mining in disused mines has increased although the
working conditions are completely deplorable.69
The Rural Aristocracy?

I am 32 years old. I have been working on the South African
mines since I was 23. I would never settle in South Africa. I am
just there to earn a livelihood for my family. I was unable to find
work in Lesotho so my father, who is now deceased, took me to
South Africa and managed to find me a mine job. He had been
a mineworker when younger and he still had contacts on the
mines. I am away in South Africa for 11 months each year and I
spend one month back in Lesotho in December and January. I try
to return home for a weekend visit at the end of every month but
transport to my home is difficult once I arrive in Lesotho.
I am separated from my wife so my mother, who is sick, looks
after the family. She makes most of the decisions about how my
money (remittances) will be spent. I have two younger sisters.
One works in a shop in South Africa but does not send anything.
The other looks after the four children. I have two young sons
(aged 2 and 4) and also have two nieces. One is the orphaned
child of my other sister and one is a child that my late father
adopted. There are also two unrelated young men in the household, both of whom are unemployed.
I earn R48,000 a year. R18,000 is sent by Teba (compulsory
deferred pay) and I send a further R6,000 which I usually bring
myself. I also buy goods in South Africa for the household, especially clothing for the children, and bring them home with me.
Last year most of the money I sent was spent on food, clothing,
transport, building a house and special events. The rest was
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spent on medical expenses, fuel, alcohol and tobacco. Since my
mother got sick, I also pay someone to hoe her field. I paid for
the funeral of a cousin and provided food for an uncle. He has
no other source of income. Once all of the household expenses
are covered, there is very little.

Commercial Farms
The commercial farms of the neighbouring Free State province of South
Africa are another important destination for migrants seeking work.70
MARS found that 5% of female migrants and 1.4% of male migrants are
farm workers (Table 14). Most of the migrants are hired on contract in
Lesotho, although some come across the border and seek work on their
own. A SAMP study of migration to the farms found that:
• The migrants had worked on Free State farms for 1 to 24 seasons, with the majority being recent employees. Males were more
recent additions to the farm workforce, averaging 2.4 seasons
as opposed to 3.7 for women. Eighty-five percent of males had
worked for 3 or less years compared with 66% of females;
• Female migrant workers are significantly older than the men. In
the main, female farm workers are older women (often widowed
or divorced). Young men with no mine experience seem to be
more inclined to take farm work than their mine-experienced,
older counterparts;
• About half of all farm workers are married. However, many more
men are single (31% compared to 7% of women), while many
more women are widowed (26% compared to 3% of men). About
40% are heads of household: 53% of male respondents and 28%
of female respondents;
• Both male and female farm workers have limited formal education and few alternative employment opportunities. Roughly 11%
have no formal schooling.71
Farm workers are drawn from the most marginalized segments of
Basotho society. The majority (around 60%) are the only wage earners
in their households, despite this income being low-wage and primarily
seasonal. When not working as seasonal farm labourers, 31% are unemployed and engage in no income generating activity. Some women undertake supplementary informal sector activity such as selling vegetables
(12.5%), beer brewing (5.3%), piece work (4.6%), herding (3.3%), carrying parcels (2.7%) and sewing (2%). Only 24% of respondents reported
having a regular (as opposed to seasonal) wage earner in their household.
The majority of Lesotho migrants on Free State farms are hired as seasonal workers (some 83% work for 4 months or less at a time). The rest
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work between 5 and 12 months per year but are not necessarily employed
by only one farmer since they seek work on other farms once their initial
contracts expire. Working conditions on the farms are highly onerous and
poorly rewarded. Migrants work for an average of 10 hours per day, 6.5
days per week during the season. Many work split shifts or until everything in the fields or factory is harvested or packaged. This means an
inconsistent and unpredictable workday – perhaps 5 hours one day and
13 the next.
The general pattern for those harvesting is to begin at about 5 a.m.,
break for brunch mid-morning and work an afternoon shift until all the
produce is harvested. In peak season this pattern is extended and work
sometimes continues until midnight. In the processing factories, workers
tend to work two 5-hour shifts with 5 hours in between. The working day
begins at 5 or 6 a.m. and only ends at 8 or 9 p.m. The average monthly
income for farmworkers in 2000 was R225.29 with the highest paid earning R600 per month. Others were earning as little as R60 per month.
Factory to Farm

I am 32 years old. I work on asparagus farms in the eastern Free
State. At first I worked in the factories in Lesotho but it was
unbearable. The man in charge of the recruitment would gather
stones and throw them at us and those who caught the stones
were the ones who were employed and the rest would go back
home.
I work on the farms because there are no jobs in Lesotho and
with the little that I get, I am able to attend to almost all the
basic needs of my family, my husband and one child. I work for 8
hours a day, seven days a week. I earn R20 a week and I am paid
every Monday. My wages are calculated on an hourly basis. The
South Africans and Basotho earn the same wages so there is no
conflict between us.
When I am looking for farm work, I go straight to the farms
I have worked on before and do not wait to be recruited in
Lesotho although it is illegal to enter into South Africa with a
purpose of working without a contract. The passports of all the
farm workers are kept by our supervisors so that we will not leave
the farm. Our movement is restricted for security purposes.
I would want to work in Lesotho. The Government of Lesotho
must create jobs for me and my fellow migrants who are forced
to go to South Africa to work.
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Domestic Work

fig

The most important occupation for female migrants is the South African
domestic service sector. Fifty percent of the migrants are domestic workers (Table 14). The majority are relatively new entrants to the labour
market, especially when compared to migrant miners (Figure 6). Only
23% of miners have five or less years of migratory experience, compared
6.pdf
1
PM
to 54%
of18/05/2010
domestic3:13
workers.
Eighty one percent of domestic workers
have 10 or less years of experience compared to only 39% of miners.

Figure 6: Length of Migration Experience by Occupation
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Domestic workers in South Africa are amongst the most poorly paid
employees in the country: with 96% earning less than R1,000 per month
in 2004 (Table 15). In contrast, 90% of mineworkers earn more than
R1,000 a month (and 57% earn more than R2,500 a month). This means
that the earning power of most female migrants from Lesotho is much
lower than that of their male counterparts.
The South African government recognizes that the working conditions and incomes of domestic workers are poor and has taken steps to
improve and regulate their employment standards. In 2006, the official minimum wage for domestic workers employed in urban areas and
working more than 27 hours per week was set at R861.90 per month.
Maximum working hours were set at 45 hours per week plus ten hours
of overtime (nine hours per day for those working 1-5 days per week and
eight hours a day for those working 6-7 days per week). Employers of
domestic workers also have to make contributions to the Unemployment
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Insurance Fund. All of these regulations can easily be avoided by employers if they employ irregular migrants from Lesotho.
Table 15: Monthly Earnings by Sector, South Africa, 2004
Sector

R1-1000 (%)

R1000-2500 (%)

>R2500 (%)

85.2

4.7

10.1

Community, social and personal services

20.4

10.7

68.9

Construction

58.0

22.2

19.8

Financial intermediation, insurance, real
estate and business

30.0

15.5

54.5

Manufacturing

38.0

23.6

38.3

Mining and quarrying

10.1

32.6

57.4

Private households

95.7

3.4

0.9

Transport, storage and communication

28.3

16.7

55.1

Wholesale and retail trade

56.0

17.3

26.7

Agriculture, hunting, forestry and fishing

Source: Labour Force Survey, Sept 2004

The age and marital profile of migrant domestic workers is very different from that of migrant miners (Table 16). The age spread of migrant
domestic workers tends to be broader than that of miners, with a greater
proportion of younger migrants. Nearly 22% of domestic workers are
under the age of 30 (compared to only 11% of miners). Two-thirds are
under the age of 40 (compared to 42% of miners). Again, in contrast
to migrant miners, more domestic workers are members of households
rather than household heads. The survey found that only 26% of domestic workers are married (compared to 90% of miners) and 24% are household heads (compared to 85% of miners). Exactly the same proportion
of domestic workers are unmarried (26.5%) while 43% are daughters
of the household and 22% are spouses of household heads. Most striking is that 47% of the domestic workers are widows, separated, divorced
or abandoned. In other words, almost half of the migrants are women
largely fending for themselves and their dependents. Like migrant miners,
the domestic workers also spend the greater part of the year away from
Lesotho (87% are away for 11 months at a time). Only 21% get home
once a month, 36% only once every six months and 20% once a year.
A SAMP study of the domestic service sector in Johannesburg provides insights into the kinds of conditions experienced by migrants.72 The
working week and day of domestic workers tend to be very long. Over
20% worked a six-day week, and another 20% worked seven days per
week. Some 46% worked nine hours or more per day and 31% worked 10
hours or more per day. Some never went off duty. Only 5% of the women
had another source of income, which on average brought them in R240
per month.
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Table 16: Age of Migrant Domestic Workers
Age Group

%

15-19

1.5

20-24

6.7

25-29

13.3

30-34

15.6

35-39

20.3

40-44

11.1

45-49

13.3

50-54

12.6

55-59

10.4

>60

8.1

Total

100.0

Source: SAMP Household Survey

Irregular Migration
Although migrants from Lesotho would prefer to migrate and work legally in South Africa, there are considerable barriers to doing so. Overseas
visitors to South Africa are automatically given 90-day temporary residence permits, while legal entrants from Lesotho are only given 30 days,
an attempt to discourage people from taking employment when in the
country. Only migrant miners, who are issued with one-year residence
and work permits, are assured of their legal status. However, if they lose
their job they are expected to return immediately to Lesotho.
Most semi-skilled and unskilled migrants from Lesotho are in an irregular work situation because it is impossible to get work permits from the
South African authorities. This is particularly true for migrant women in
the domestic service sector. Male migrants working in industries such as
construction also generally work irregularly. Irregularity exposes migrants
to exploitation and abuse and gives them little recourse to the police or
justice system. As the Director of Immigration in Lesotho observed about
migrant construction workers:
They get employed as casual labourers. Because of 2010
(Soccer World Cup), there are a number of constructions
going on. In the case of casual undocumented labourers,
they are underpaid, work long hours for less pay and at times
their employers inform the police about them when it is time
to pay them and they have to run away leaving their wages
behind.73
The Director of Consular Affairs in the Department of Foreign Affairs
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claimed that this was a deliberate strategy by employers to avoid having
to pay for work performed:
There are a few types of these informal job opportunities,
namely domestic service and construction. Those who are
not lucky face challenges such as not being paid. Most of the
construction company owners are involved in many businesses, and to boost those that are lagging behind, they use
the resources from those that are vibrant. These people are
mostly respected in the townships (by black South Africans)
and they use that influence to chase away the Basotho
employees at the end of the month when they are supposed
to be paid. They call locals to come and chase away Basotho
or call the police to inform them that there are illegal immigrants in the area. Basotho are usually forced to leave without being paid.74
The Director of Immigration confirmed that female domestic workers
face similar treatment:
We are aware of the agencies such as Household Helpers
that hire domestic servants to go and work in South Africa
without following proper (legal) channels. This exposes
Basotho nationals to exploitation such as the employer
keeping their passport to prevent them from going home as
they would like to, being underpaid and not enjoying similar
benefits as South Africans doing the same jobs.
Irregular employment depresses the wages paid to Basotho migrants,
leaving them with less to remit. The apparently widespread practice of
“chasing” or “squealing” on casual employees to avoid paying them at
month end is a violation of fundamental labour rights but leaves the
migrant with nothing to remit at all.
A South African ID makes a great difference to employment prospects, as a female migrant from one Focus Group pointed out:
Getting to South Africa and staying and working there
is not a problem. But it is not easy to access good work
in South Africa as almost all migrants don’t have South
African IDs (Identity Documents). When you have a South
African ID, you are able to get better work than people
who hold only Lesotho passports. If you are offered a good
job, you fail to secure it because you only have a Lesotho
passport and end up having to do low-paying jobs such as
domestic or shop work. This goes even for those people with
high school education.75
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The value of South African documentation is clearly recognized by
migrants. Although fraudulent South African identity and citizenship
documentation is always available at a price, some Basotho are able to
acquire them through formal application. Basotho in South Africa and
Lesotho are ethnically and linguistically homogenous (there are actually
more Sesotho-speakers in South Africa than in Lesotho). It is therefore
relatively easy to get a direct or distant relative to vouchsafe for the
migrant’s South African ‘roots.’
Does this mean that the “enclave will empty” or that transnational
forms of migration will continue or even become more extensive? The
evidence suggests that the probability of migrants maintaining strong
ties with Lesotho is very high. Nearly two-thirds of the migrants (61%)
identified in the household survey return to Lesotho from South Africa
at least once a month (compared with a regional average of only 36.3%)
(Table 17). A total of 85% return home at least once every three months
and 93% at least once every six months. Again, the frequency of personal
home visits is much higher than the regional average of 45% every three
months and 54% every six months.
Table 17: Frequency of Home Visits
How often does the migrant come home?
Twice or more per month

Lesotho (%)

Region (%)

1.5

6.2

55.6

30.1

9.2

9.0

Once every 3 months

15.2

12.5

Once every 6 months

8.1

9.7

Once a year

8.2

18.5

At end of the contract

0.2

2.6

Other

2.2

11.4

100.0

100.0

Once a month
More than once in 3 months

Total
Source: SAMP Household Survey

The Trials of Irregular Migration

I am 23 years old and live in Lesotho with my 71-year-old
grandmother who is a widow, and my 37-year-old aunt. She was
abandoned by her husband. Also there is my 18-year-old brother
and 10-year-old sister. Both of my parents are now dead. I first
went to South Africa because my mother and her children were
starving. I only have primary education.
I have been away from home for a year. When I left for South
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Africa, I got a job with a construction firm. I actually left home
not knowing where I would go. All I had decided was to reach
any destination where the money I had would allow. I knew
that a person never gets lost and indeed I met somebody who
I talked to. This person was there for the same reason. I stayed
with him. He is also from Lesotho. Ever since I migrated to
South Africa, the money I’ve been earning can only support
one person or two at the most. Sometimes there is nothing. It
is good that I migrated because there are no jobs in Lesotho
and it does not look as if there will be any. Life is still tough.
I earned only R4,800 in my first year as a casual labourer. I sent
home R800 which was spent on food, clothing, transport and
fuel. The household regularly goes without food. I have recently
been joined in South Africa by my brother who is still unemployed. When I crossed the border to South Africa, I was given
a 30-day permit. I have to return to the border once a month to
renew it. Some people overstay and then they have to pay a bribe
to border officials when they eventually return. Others send their
passports to the borders with taxi-drivers who get them stamped
for a fee and a bribe to the official.
I have money problems especially because employers differ.
Sometimes the bosses are reliable, sometimes not. I have worked
for many employers who have not paid me yet. Towards the end
of the year I took the tools to my boss because he had failed
to pay me for some months. I wanted to go home but I had no
money. I told my boss that I would take his tools to the office and
there he would have to pay me in order to get them. Instead of
doing what I asked him to do, he organized some guys to kill me.
They beat me very badly, and they would have succeeded had the
police not arrived on the scene. My boss told the police that I was
a thief, and that he did not know me at all. He participated in
the beating. The police wanted to take me away but, battered as
I was, I refused to go because I needed my side of the story to be
known. I agreed to be taken to my employer (the contractor) but
he ultimately ran away. The guys who beat me up again raided
my place where I stay. They took my belongings. Another day
I was going to the office when I saw them. I was told they had
guns. I ran away. Some (South Africans) treat us well and relations are good but some show much hatred to foreigners.
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Volume and Type of Remittances
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fig

lobal remittances have grown to the point where they exceed
Official Development Assistance (ODA) and are approaching the level of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI). In Africa
as a whole, the picture is rather different with ODA now
exceeding FDI. Remittance flows are significantly lower (although data
deficiencies are such that the actual flows may be much higher). Lesotho
presents a different scenario with remittances being most important, followed by Customs Union Revenue, ODA and finally FDI (Figure 7).
Lesotho’s major external sources of revenue include:
(a) 	Southern African Customs Union (SACU) Revenue: SACU
governs trade for the member countries of Botswana, Lesotho,
Swaziland, Namibia and South Africa. The Union has a common
external tariff and guarantees free movement of goods amongst
member countries. SACU’s revenue-sharing formula has generated a growing proportion of public revenue in Lesotho, rising to
M1,107 million in 2003.
(b) 	Official Development Assistance: Lesotho’s ODA inflows fell 
dramatically after the end of apartheid. After 1999, however,
ODA to Lesotho picked up again primarily because of international attention on the impact of the HIV and AIDS epidemic.
(c) Foreign Direct Investment: FDI increased throughout the 1990s
with the growth of the textile industry (peaking in 1998) but has
fallen by 50% since.
(d)1 Migrant
Remittances:
migrant remittances have remained the
7.pdf
23/06/2010
1:37 PM
major revenue source for Lesotho, rising to an estimated M1,939
million in 2004.

Figure 7: Flows of FDI, ODA, Remittances and SACU Revenue to Lesotho
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The only completely accurate and reliable data on remittance flows is for
compulsory deferred pay (CPD) from the South African mining industry
to Lesotho. These remittances are “formal” in that they are channeled
through the formal banking system and are captured in official statistics.
In 1974, the government passed the Lesotho Deferred Pay Act (Act No.
18 of 1974) which established the legal terms and conditions of a compulsory remittance system for mineworkers.76 A portion of the miner’s
wage (initially between 60-90%) was compulsorily deferred and paid into
a special account in the Lesotho National Development Bank. Miners
received some interest on their deposits, the balance accruing to the government. The funds could only be drawn in Lesotho by the miner himself
at the end of a contract. The CDP system ensured that the greater part
of a migrant’s earnings returned as remittances to Lesotho.
The Deferred Pay Act has been amended several times. A 1979 revision stipulated that 60% of the basic wage would be deposited in Lesotho
with the exception of earnings during the first 30 days of employment
on a contract. In 1990, the percentage of compulsorily deferred pay was
reduced to 30% (excluding the first and last month of the contract).
Currently, miners are forced to defer 30% of their gross earnings for 10
months of every 12-month contract. Deferred wages can be accessed by
the miner or their bona fide spouse. The recent failure of the Lesotho
National Development Bank and widespread dissatisfaction amongst
miners with the way the system operated prompted TEBA Bank to reach
an agreement with government about taking over the system. TEBA
Bank now operates an automated deferred pay system although there is
still dissatisfaction amongst miners and their spouses about the way the
system runs.
There is a misleading assumption that the decline in employment on
the South African mines for Basotho migrants led to a serious decline
in remittance flows to Lesotho.77 In fact, remittances increased over the
time period as the total wages paid out to Basotho miners grew from
M1,473 million in 1992 to M2,442 million in 2004. The main reason is
that the average mine wage increased from M12,000 in 1992 to M53,000
in 2007 (Table 18). The CDP system ensured that Lesotho received a
portion of this increase (from M276 million in 1992 to M610 million in
2004). However, the Central Bank of Lesotho estimates that voluntary
remittances have also grown (from M1,103 million in 1992 to M1,795
million in 2004). In other words, the Lesotho economy as a whole has
not suffered from retrenchments and nor have those households with
members still working on the mines. Retrenchments have meant that
growing remittance flows are shared by a shrinking number of households. Households who still have a mine worker migrant are clearly
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better off than those who do not, and constitute something of a “rural
aristocracy.”
Remittance flows to Lesotho can be classified according to whether
they are: (a) compulsory or voluntary; (b) formal or informal (in terms of
channels used); and (c) cash or in-kind. Remittances in cash and kind
are the main source of income for the vast majority of migrant-sending
households in Lesotho. MARS showed that 95% receive regular cash
remittances and 20% receive remittances-in-kind (Table 19). Only 9% of
the households receive income from regular wage work and 6% from casual work in Lesotho. Additionally, only 9% receive income from a formal
or informal business and just 3% from the sale of farm products.
Table 18: Mine Remittances to Lesotho from South Africa
Year

Total Wages
(M million)

Average Annual
Wage (M)

Remittances
(M million)

CDP (M million)

1992

1473.5

12,321

1103.8

275.9

1993

1551.4

13,359

1104.5

334.4

1994

1641.5

14,562

1170.5

320.0

1995

1743.0

16,801

1242.8

410.6

1996

1951.9

19,186

1391.7

488.0

1997

2032.7

21,193

1321.2

508.2

1998

1996.2

24,678

1217.7

499.1

1999

1897.4

27,657

1157.4

474.4

2000

1955.5

30,131

1394.3

488.9

2001

1966.6

32,030

1402.2

491.7

2002

2196.5

35,236

1594.8

549.1

2003

2364.8

38,513

1686.1

591.2

2004

2442.1

42,116

1795.0

610.5

Source: GOL

Annualised average household income for migrant-sending households from all sources was M11,475. Mean household income from 
remittances was M8,400 for cash and M2,488 for goods. Income from
other sources was relatively significant for the small number of households that had more diversified income. For example, the 2% of households with a formal business made an average of M6,708 from their
business. Or again, the 3% of households selling farm produce made an
average of M1,525 from those sales. The 7% of households participating
in the informal sector made an average of M3,066 from those operations.
In many cases, remittances are not a supplementary form of household
income, they are virtually the only form of income.
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Figure 8: Mineworker Remittances to Lesotho, 1992-2004
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Table 19: Sources of Income of Migrant-Sending Households
%
Wage work
Casual work

9.5

Mean Annual Income (M)
7,420.83

6.3

2,618.28

Remittances – money

95.3

10,186.44

Remittances – value of goods

20.0

2,487.70

Income from farm products

2.7

1,525.93

Income from formal business

2.0

6,708.00

Income from informal business

6.8

3,066.41

Pension/disability

0.6

1,025.00

Gifts

2.2

1,178.86

Source: SAMP Household Survey

There are distinctive differences in remitting patterns by occupation
and skill level. Miners remit an average of M10,677 per annum which is
more than skilled workers and professionals (M6,260) who, in turn, remit
more than other migrants (mainly unskilled women) who remit an average of M3,939 per annum. Female migrant domestic workers in South
Africa remit much less than male miners, which is not surprising given
the wage differentials between the two sectors. Female domestic workers
remit an average of M3,632 per annum (one third the amount of miners). Their remittances are also less frequent than those of miners, most
of whom remit once a month or more. Only 42% of domestic workers are
able to remit that frequently. Another 20% remit once every 2-3 months
and the rest even less often.
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In general, households in Lesotho receive remittances frequently and
regularly: 78% of households receive cash remittances at least once a
month (Table 20). The average annual cash remittance receipt reported
by households was M7,800.
Table 20: Frequency of Cash Remittances to Lesotho
N
Twice or more per month

% of HH

12

1.2

787

76.6

More than twice in 3 months

91

8.9

Once in three months

66

6.4

Once every 6 months

16

1.6

Once a year

51

5.0

At end of the contract

2

0.2

Other

0

0.0

Once a month

Don’t know
Total

2

0.2

1027

100.0

Source: SAMP Household Survey

The “remittance package” of migrants from Lesotho also includes
goods. Goods are purchased by migrants where they work and then sent
or brought home to Lesotho. The proximity of the two countries makes
this a feasible option, particularly since there is a greater range of consumer goods in South Africa and prices are generally lower. In addition,
as members of a common customs union, there should be no duty to pay
when migrants bring goods home. In practice, customs officials at official
border posts do demand duty. MARS showed that 20% of migrant-
sending households had received remittances in kind in the month prior
to the survey. The average annual value of goods remitted to Lesotho was
R2,487.
How do migrant-sending households compare with those that do
not have migrant members? In another survey, SAMP collected data
that compared income for migrant-sending households with a national
sample of all households (Table 21).78 Over half of the national sample
(52%) reported an annual cash income of less than M2,500 compared
to only 12% of migrant-sending households. Again, three quarters of the
national sample have an income of less than M7,500 compared to 40% of
the migrant-sending-households. In other words, while the vast majority
of all households have very low incomes, the migrant-sending households
are better off.
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Table 21: Distribution of Household Income
Household
Income Group (M)

National Sample of Households

Migrant-Sending Households

%

Cumulative %

%

Cumulative %

0-2499

51.8

51.8

12.2

12.2

2,500-4,999

14.8

66.6

10.4

22.6

5,000-7,499

7.9

74.5

16.7

39.3

7,500-9,999

6.3

80.9

15.6

54.9

10,000-12,499

5.6

86.4

15.1

70.0

12,500-14,999

3.3

89.8

9.2

79.2

15,000-17,499

1.6

91.3

4.9

84.1

17,500-19,999

2.2

93.5

4.9

89.0

20,000-22,499

0.8

94.4

2.1

91.1

22,500-24,999

1.1

95.5

2.7

93.8

25,000-27,499

0.3

95.8

1.3

95.1

27,500-29,999

0.3

96.2

0.6

95.7

30,000-32,499

0.3

96.5

0.7

96.4

32,500-34,999

0.2

96.7

0.4

96.8

35000 and up

3.3

100.0

3.2

100.0

Source: SAMP Data Base

Remittance Channels

T

he CDP system linking Lesotho with the South African mines
is the primary formal channel for remittance flows. Outside the
system, the most popular ways of remitting are informal. This
is true for Lesotho and the region (Table 22). Migrants bring
the money to Lesotho themselves (54%) or send it via a trusted friend
or co-worker (33%). Very few use other formal money transfer systems;
for example, only 5% use the Post Office and only 2% use banks. Easily
the most popular way of sending goods home is to bring them personally
(82%). A smaller number entrust them to friend or co-workers (12%).
But only 4% use official rail transport channels and less than 1% entrust
their goods to the taxis that ply the routes between Lesotho and the
South African towns where they work.
Considerable attention is given in the remittance literature to the
methods that migrants use to remit and the expense involved in remitting, through both formal and informal channels. The main policy recommendation is that governments and private sector institutions should
lower the transaction costs of remitting, as well as make it easier for
migrants to access and use formal channels through reform of banking
and other financial regulations. In the case of Lesotho, hand-to-hand
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transfer of cash and goods is easily the most important channel. It is hard
to see how transaction costs on personal transactions can be reduced
unless the reason for return home is only to transfer remittances, in
which case transportation costs make this a very costly means of remitting.
Table 22: Major Remittance Channels
Cash
Lesotho %

Goods
Region %

Lesotho %

Region %

Post Office

5.1

7.1

0.7

4.2

Wife’s TEBA account

1.8

3.1

-

-

Bring personally

54.1

46.8

81.9

66.0

Via a friend/ co-worker

33.4

26.2

11.8

14.7

Via Bank in home country

1.8

6.1

-

-

Via TEBA own account

0.7

3.3

-

-

Bank in South Africa

0.9

0.8

-

-

Via Taxis

0.2

1.5

0.7

3.5

Bus

0.0

1.1

3.8

5.2

Rail

-

-

0.0

1.3

1.9

3.9

0.7

2.9

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

Other method
Total

Source: SAMP Household Survey

Using friends and co-workers to carry cash and goods home is also
relatively popular and, once again, quite feasible given geographical proximity. Problems that arise within this method pertain mainly to slowness
and theft. Very few migrants cite either the cost of transactions or the
lack of banking facilities as a problem for them. Basotho migrants do not
generally see a problem in need of a solution. This does not mean that
if cost-effective financial services were available, migrants would not use
them. Some certainly might. But at the moment, most seem happier to
take remittances with them when they go home.
The survey confirmed very low usage of formal institutions for money
transfer between South Africa and Lesotho. The problem is not in moving money as both countries are members of the Rand Monetary Area
(RMA). The Rand is legal tender in Lesotho (though not vice-versa).
Many South African banks have branches in Lesotho but few migrants
use the banks to remit. Generally, there is very low access to financial
services in Lesotho.79 Most migrants do not have bank accounts with
the main banks and the costs of transfer, even within the RMA, are
prohibitive. Bank products cost around R150 per transaction because
banks charge a SWIFT fee and commission on each transaction even
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when funds are transferred to subsidiaries of the same bank in Lesotho.80
A transfer to Maseru in Lesotho costs 700% more than a transfer to
Ladybrand on the South African side of the border only kilometers
away.81 Undocumented Basotho migrants cannot open bank accounts in
South Africa as a work permit is required to open a resident or non-resident account.82
Outside the CDP through Teba Bank, the Post Office is probably
the most used formal channel (but only by 5% of migrants). The South
African Post Office remits outside the country via money order or postal
order but transaction costs are high (R30.50 for a R300 money order and
R51.75 for a telegraphic money order).83 Oganizations such as Western
Union and MoneyGram do not operate in Lesotho. Less than 1% of
migrants use TEBA Bank as their main method for transferring voluntary remittances. Slightly more (2%) pay remittances into spousal TEBA
Bank accounts.
Informal Remitting

I am 42 years old and I have been a migrant for two years, when
my husband became too sick to continue working on the South
African mines. Before I stayed in Lesotho and looked after the
household and children while my husband was away. We have
four children: two are boys aged 21 and 16 and two girls 8 and 4.
My oldest son has a high school education but could not find a
job in Lesotho. He went last year to South Africa to work as an
unskilled labourer. I think it is better for women to go to work
in South Africa these days because every time you hear stories
from men that there is no money, no work, or the job they were
doing is finished.
I went because my husband was unable to work anymore and
sitting together at home without a breadwinner made us reach
a decision for me to go and fend for the family. I also wanted to
earn some more money so that I could come back home and start
some small business (a spaza shop). I heard about an employment
agency north of Pretoria that was placing Basotho domestics with
South African employers. So I went there and got a job.
I earn R12,000 a year. I send home R10,000 a year which is spent
on food, clothing, fuel, hiring a tractor to plough the field and a
small packet of seed to sow in my field. I post the money home
or bring it myself after two months. This money is received by my
husband. I do not make the decisions as to how the money I send
is to be used. I send it to him because he is the one taking care of
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the children. I think this money makes a difference in providing
food, for without it my children would die of hunger. One of my
sons has to repeat Standard. He only got a third class pass but I
do not know if the money I send will be enough to send him to
school.
I want to save money but I am unable to do so. Even if I save,
my [money] will not go towards my business. There are many
deaths these days and the money saved would help in the burial
of members of my household or me.
I have a Lesotho passport but I do not have a work permit. In
order to remain in South Africa, I need to renew my visitor’s permit once a month back at the border. I could overstay and then
I have to pay a bribe of M150 to M200 demanded by officials at
the border when I return to Lesotho.

Use of Remittances

I

nterviews with remittance senders and receivers suggest that the
former decide how much to send and the latter make most of the
decisions about how remittances will be spent. Although there are
disagreements, very few respondents indicated that there is serious
conflict about the use of remittances, probably because such a small proportion is ever truly discretionary. Once school fees are paid, health costs
met, and clothing and groceries bought, there is not much left. Conflict
arises when a spouse feels that the wage earner is wasting remittance
money on non-essentials or is being dishonest:
My husband is no use to our family at all and if things could
be reversed it would be better if I went to work instead of
him and maybe there would be some change in our lives.
My husband does not send money and even when he brings
it with him, he takes it to buy beer and entertain himself.
He fights for it if I refuse to give him the money. When he
comes home he does not even want to take a spade to dig
the garden. He says he has come home to rest as he works
hard in the mines. Him working in South Africa brings only
negative impacts and he is no use at all to the family.84
Her spouse has been working for 20 years on the mines as a migrant.
She had no idea how much he earns (but it is probably in excess of
R30,000 a year). She claimed she only gets R3,000, all of which she
spends on food and clothing, including for her niece and her husband’s
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mother. The family, she said, do not have enough to eat many times during the course of the year. She is happy about compulsory deferred pay
because she would otherwise “never see a cent of it.” However, only her
husband is able to withdraw the funds in Lesotho, which he does “without my knowledge and eats alone.”
Both remitters and recipients agree that remittances are essential to
the livelihood of household members and that without them they would
be “lost.” There are plenty of “lost” households in every village. The perceived importance of remittances proved to be extremely high (Table 23).
Most households (89%) find the contribution of remittances to household income important or very important. Remittances are also key to
having enough food in the household (with nearly 90% saying that it is
important or very important).
Table 23: Perceived Importance of Remittances
Very
Important

Important

In Having Enough to Eat

73.4

16.5

In Having Enough Clean
Water

40.2

17.3

In Accessing Medical
Treatment

62.6

In Having Enough
Cooking Fuel
In Having a Cash
Income

Neutral

Not
Important

Not
Important
at All

Don’t
Know

2.2

3.0

4.7

0.2

9.6

11.6

20.8

0.6

25.0

3.8

3.2

5.3

0.2

58.7

28.5

3.9

2.2

6.5

0.2

63.1

25.7

2.9

2.5

5.6

0.1

N=1026
Source: SAMP Household Survey

How do migrant-sending households in Lesotho actually spend
their remittance income? First, it is useful to look at household budgets
(Table 24). Food and groceries are by far the most important expenditure (incurred by 93% of households in the month prior to the survey),
followed by fuel (76%), clothes (73%), transportation (52%) and medical expenses (24%). Only 9% saved anything, 7% invested in farming
and 5% spent on education. Over the course of a year, the proportion
of households spending money on school fees would probably be much
higher as all secondary school children in Lesotho have to pay fees at the
beginning of the school year.
The average household spent M490 on food and M678 on clothes
in the month prior to the survey. Much less was spent on the two other
major items: fuel (M120) and transportation (M124). The households
with medical expenses spent an average of M101. The 5% of households
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that spent on education incurred significant costs of M662. While only
a small proportion of households had funds to spend on building, special
events and farming, the average amounts were quite significant (M3,073,
M2,176 and M642 respectively). Almost half (47%) of households had
no savings. Less than 10% of households had saved any money in the
previous month; those that did saved an average of M740. The largest
monthly expenditure of all households combined was on clothes (29%),
followed by food and groceries (27%), special events (9%), building (6%),
fuel (5%), entertainment (4.2%) and transportation (2%).
Table 24: Monthly Household Expenses by Category
% of Households
Incurring Expense

Average Amount
Spent (M)

92.5

490

Housing

0.9

Utilities

16.7

Clothes
Alcohol

Food and groceries

Total Amount
Spent (M)

%

462,560

26.9

150

1,350

0.0

117

20,007

1.2

72.7

673

499,366

29.0

12.0

209

25,707

1.5

Medical expenses

24.2

101

24,947

1.5

Transportation

52.3

124

71,556

2.4

Cigarettes, tobacco, snuff

10.5

84

8,968

0.5

Education

5.4

663

36,465

2.0

Entertainment

1.6

125

72,000

4.2

8.7

740

65,860

3.8

76.3

120

93,480

5.4

Savings
Fuel
Farming

7.1

642

46,224

2.7

Building

3.5

3,073

110,628

6.4

Special events

7.3

2,176

163,220

9.5

Gifts

3.6

119

4,403

0.3

Other expenses

1.2

1,060

12,720

0.7

Source: SAMP Household Survey

The most common uses of remittances are for food (90% of households spent remittances on food), clothing (76%), school fees (56%) and
fares for transportation (34%) (Table 25). In terms of agricultural inputs,
a quarter of households spent remittances on seed, 18% on fertilizer, 12%
on tractors and 4% on livestock. However, most of these agriculturerelated expenditures were for subsistence food production. Nearly 19% of
households put some remittance income into savings. Other expenditures
such as funerals (incurred by 16% of households) and funeral and burial
insurance policies (29%) reflect the impact of HIV/AIDS.
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Table 25: Use of Remittances
% of HH
Food

89.3

Clothing

76.1

School fees

56.0

Fares

50.0

Funeral and burial policies

28.7

Seed

24.4

Savings

18.7

Fertiliser

18.5

Funeral

16.3

Tractor

12.5

Fuel

9.9

Feast

7.1

Cement

5.2

Labour

5.1

Bricks

4.5

Insurance policies

4.5

Doors and windows

3.8

Roofing

3.6

Dipping and veterinary costs

2.6

Oxen for ploughing

2.5

Other special events

2.2

Paint

2.0

Repay loans

1.9

Cattle purchase

1.4

Wood

1.3

Marriage

1.1

Purchase stock for sale

1.1

Small stock purchase

1.1

Poultry purchase

0.8

Vehicle purchase/maintenance

0.8

Vehicle and transport costs

0.6

Walls

0.7

Other farm input

0.4

Equipment

0.3

Labour costs

0.3

Machinery and equipment

0.1

Personal investment

0.0

Source: SAMP Household Survey
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The importance of basic needs expenditure is further highlighted
when the estimated percentage of remittance money is examined for the
most important expenditures (Table 26). For all major expense items the
proportion of the remittance contribution is 80% and higher. Migrantsending households in Lesotho thus spend the greater proportion of total
income on basic necessities. In other words, consumption spending (for
necessities, not luxuries) constitutes the predominant usage of household
income, a pattern observed in many other parts of the developing world.
Table 26: Proportion of Expenses Paid from Remittances
%
Food and groceries

90.3

Housing

91.1

Utilities

85.1

Clothes

92.1

Alcohol

89.9

Medical expenses

86.4

Transportation

89.6

Cigarettes, tobacco, snuff

86.1

Education

86.8

Entertainment

100.0

Savings

83.0

Fuel

88.7

Farming

88.5

Building

91.2

Special events

85.4

Gifts

71.2

Total contributions from remittances

88.7

Source: SAMP Household Survey

Further proof of the importance of migration to household food
security and basic needs is seen in the types of goods that migrants sent
home. There is little evidence of luxury goods being remitted. Instead,
clothing (29% of households) and food (8%) are the items most frequently brought or sent (Table 27).
Remittance-receiving households are not the only ones to benefit
from remittances. Within villages, there are formal and informal local
relationships of obligation, reciprocity and charity with kin and neighbours by which remittances “spread” beyond the immediate beneficiary
household. In most cases, remittances are spent on immediate household
members, but are also passed on to other relatives, friends or poorer
members of the community. One household, for example, consists of
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six people.85 The de facto household head is a young male of 22, a university student. He looks after his younger brother (aged 18) and two
younger sisters (aged 13 and 4). His two older sisters are both migrants
to South Africa. One (aged 25) has been working in a shop in South
Africa for 5 years. The other (aged 24) has just gone to South Africa for
the first time. This household has four members in school yet receives
no remittances at all directly from the two female migrant members in
South Africa. Yet it still spent R4,000 on food, R1,700 on school fees
and R1,500 on clothes over the previous year. The key is their widowed
father. After their mother died, he moved in with a woman in another
household. The two sisters send their remittances to their father “who
decides how the money should be used.” The father splits the money
between his new household and that of his children.
Table 27: Proportion of Households Receiving Remitted Goods
Type of Goods
Clothing

%
28.6

Food

7.6

Consumption Goods

2.5

Fuel

0.7

Equipment

0.5

Seed

0.2

Poultry

0.2

Goods for Funeral

0.2

Goods for Feast

0.2

Roofing

0.1

Gender and Remittances
Four basic types of migrant-sending and remittance-receiving households
were identified by MARS (Table 28):
• Female-headed: No husband/male partner; may include relatives,
children, friends;
• Male-headed: No wife/female partner; may include relatives, children, friends;
• Nuclear: Man and woman with or without children; usually malehead;
• Extended: Man and woman and children and other relatives and
non-relatives; male-head
The vast majority of male Basotho migrants (nearly 90%) come from
nuclear and extended family households. Only 55% of female migrants
come from such households. A significant minority (43%) come from
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female-headed households in which there is no husband or male partner
(Table 28).
Table 28: Migrant-Sending Household Typology
Male Migrants
Female-headed

Female Migrants

7.0

Male-headed

42.9

3.8

0.7

Nuclear

43.3

18.6

Extended

45.9

37.8

Total

100

100

Source: SAMP Household Survey

Most striking is the great significance of migrant remittances to household subsistence and basic material needs, regardless of migrant gender.
The general importance of remittances is evident in the straightforward
proportion of migrant-sending households that receive money from their
migrant members (Table 29). At close to 90% in Lesotho, Swaziland and
Zimbabwe, this is an extremely high figure in international comparative
terms. Male migrants from Lesotho are slightly more likely to remit than
female migrants. Given that male migrant labour is mainly in the mining
sector, where remittances are compulsory, and that female migrant labour
is in more precarious sectors of the South African labour market, it is
surprising that this observed gender discrepancy in remittance behaviour
is not higher.
Table 29: Proportion of Households Receiving Remittances
Country

Male Migrant-Sending Households (%)

Female Migrant-Sending Households (%)

Lesotho

94.9

89.3

Mozambique

79.6

58.8

Swaziland

88.8

92.9

Zimbabwe

89.5

90.1

Source: SAMP Household Survey

The amounts of money remitted by female migrants overall are
significantly lower than those of male migrants (Table 30). Women’s
employment and livelihood strategies – for example as informal sector
traders or domestic workers compared to waged mine labour – mean
lower earnings overall and less regular or reliable remuneration. In addition, female migrants who are daughters, rather than spouses or heads of
household, may remit a lower proportion of their earnings compared to
male migrants, who are more likely to be heads of household and primary
breadwinners.
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Table 30: Average Annual Remittances Received from Male and Female Migrants
Male Migrants
Mean
Median

Female Migrants

M11,162.46

M4,825.32

M9,600.00

M3,600.00

Source: SAMP Household Survey

While the gender differences in the monetary value of remittances
are stark, Lesotho’s female migrants remit significantly higher sums
than their counterparts in Swaziland, Mozambique or Zimbabwe. This
could be because the need for remittance income is greater in Lesotho,
with fewer alternative livelihood options available and migrant-sending
households being more directly dependent on migrant remittances. This
is especially true for the female-headed households that make up a high
proportion of Lesotho households sending female migrants.
Gender differences diminish significantly when remittances are considered in terms of their contribution to the household economy, rather
than their absolute monetary value. Migrant remittances form an important, and in many cases the only, source of income for male and female
migrant-sending households in Lesotho (Table 31). Over 95% of the
households with male migrant members listed remittances as a source of
household income. Fewer than 10% list income from the second-ranking income source, non-migrant wage labour. The equivalent proportions
for female-sending households are around 90% and 15%. Households
sending male migrants thus appear to be especially dependent on remittance earnings. This reflects both the higher proportion of male migrants
who are household heads, and the higher earnings of male migrants,
which make it more feasible to rely solely on remittances to meet basic
household needs. Households sending female migrants are more likely to
have to supplement remittance earnings with other sources of income, as
female migrants remit lower sums. Female migrants are also less likely to
be household heads, which means that they are often members of households with other working adult members, especially in cases where they
come from extended families.
Taking these factors into consideration, it is again surprising that the
gender discrepancies in remittance dependence are not greater. Lesotho’s
gender differences in household income sources are lower than for any
of the other countries surveyed, including Zimbabwe. In sum, female
migrant remittances are a demonstrably important source of both income
and material goods for households sending female migrants. Whether
they are household heads, spouses or daughters, women migrants are
clearly sending significant sums of money and quantities of goods back
to their families in Lesotho, contributing in no small way to those households’ material welfare.
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Table 31: Sources of Household Income in Male and Female Migrant-Sending Households
Source of Household Income

Male Migrant-Sending (%)

Female Migrant-Sending (%)

Wage work

8.3

15.0

Casual work

5.0

12.1

Remittances – money

95.7

90.0

Remittances – goods

19.6

22.8

Farm product sales

2.4

2.8

Formal business

2.1

1.4

Informal business

6.5

6.4

Pension/ disability

0.2

2.1

Gifts

2.4

1.4

Other

0

0

Refused to answer

0

0

Don’t know

0.5

2.1

N

841

140

Source: SAMP Household Survey
Note: Because many households had more than one source of income, percentages add up to more
than 100%.

Female migrants and remittance recipients feel that their priorities in
using remittances differ from those of men. As one Focus Group participant observed:
Men and women spend money differently. Women often
spend money inside the home while men on the other hand
spend it outside the family. Men use the money to buy beer
and other entertaining items while women would rather buy
something that will benefit the whole family, such as buying food for the whole family. The man would take M100 of
the money he brought home and use it to entertain himself
alone but when he gets home he would demand food. The
following day he takes another R100 and he would do that
the whole holiday he is at home.86
Categories of household expenditure (Table 32) show only small 
differences between male and female migrant-sending households. What
is different is the amount of money spent, which is considerably lower for
households sending female migrants (Table 33).
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Table 32: Proportion of Migrant-Sending Households Incurring Particular Expense
Expense Incurred in Previous Month

Male Migrant-Sending (%)

Food/Groceries

Female Migrant-Sending (%)

93.3

90.0

Housing

0.7

1.4

Utilities

17.7

12.1

Clothes

73.7

68.6

Alcohol

13.0

5.7

Medical costs

26.5

12.9

Transport

54.8

39.3

Tobacco

10.9

8.6

5.7

3.6

Education
Entertainment

1.7

0.7

Savings

10.1

2.1

Fuel

77.9

69.3

Farming

7.7

4.3

Building

3.9

0.7

Special events

7.7

5.7

Gifts

3.9

2.1

Other

0.8

1.4

N

841

140

Source: SAMP Household Survey

Table 33: Migrant-Sending Household Expenditures87
Median Amount Spent in Previous Month (M)
Category

Male Migrant-Sending (%)

Food/Groceries

400

Female Migrant-Sending (%)
215

Utilities

60

75

Clothes

500

350

Medical expenses

50

33

Transport

70

40

Education

230

230

90

50

350

100

Domestic fuel
Farming
Source: SAMP Household Survey

The main household purchases for both male and female migrantsending households are the basic commodities of food, domestic fuel,
and clothing, in addition to fundamental services such as transport and
health care (Table 32). In terms of the number of households reporting
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expenditure in a particular category in the previous month, the most
common expenditures are, in rank order, food, domestic fuel (e.g. paraffin, wood, gas), clothing, and transport. Some gender differences emerge
in the reported monetary expenditure in various categories (Table 33).
Expenditure was found to be higher in almost every category for male
compared to female migrant-sending households, and this was more
consistently the case for Lesotho than for any of the other countries in
the survey. This suggests that in Lesotho in particular, households with
female migrant members (many of which, it should be recalled, were also
female-headed) are indeed poorer and forced to ‘go without’ more often
than households where the migrant members are men.
Given the weighting of overall household expenditures towards
basic necessities, what is the role of remittances in enabling migrantsending households to purchase certain goods and services? Are remittances spent on the same general basket of items? Or are they used for
non-essential or luxury items, or perhaps directed towards savings or
investment in business or other productive activities? Food is the most
common annual expenditure of remittance earnings in both male- and
female-migrant households (Table 34). Second is clothing, followed by
school fees. Transport fares rank fourth, with funeral policies the fifthgreatest expenditure of remittance income.
Table 34: Ranking of Most Important Uses of Cash Remittances Over Previous Year
Male Migrant-Sending Households

Female Migrant-Sending Households

Food

Food

Clothes

Clothes

Schooling

Schooling

Fares

Fares

Funeral policies

Funeral policies

Remittance-receiving households confirmed the significance of remittances to food purchases (Table 35). The most consistent importance
rating, for both migrant genders, is food, with school fees and clothes
also rated highly by many. There are some gender differences, with men’s
remittances seemingly more crucial to the purchase of basic livelihood
items, such as food, than women’s. Given that men are older, more likely
to be married, and more often the heads of households than female
migrants, it is perhaps surprising that this gender difference was not
greater.
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Table 35: Importance of Remittances in Annual Household Expenditure
Category

Male Migrant-Sending (%)

Food

Very important
Important

Clothes

Schooling

Female Migrant-Sending (%)

72.0

68.6

8.0

8.6

Very important

53.0

50.1

Important

21.3

12.1

Very important

50.8

37.9

Important

8.0

8.6

39.0

80.0

Fares

Very important
Important

13.3

7.9

Seed

Very important

20.7

27.1

Savings

Very important

Funeral policies

Very important
Important

9.9

5.7

Funerals

Very important

9.5

40.7

Important

Important

Important
N

4.5

1.4

16.4

27.1

4.5

5.7

19.6

59.3

6.8

7.1

841

140

Source: SAMP Household Survey

What stands out is the fundamental importance of remittances in
enabling migrant-sending households to meet their basic needs, such as
food and clothing, and basic services such as transport and schooling.
Remittances are used to some extent to support agricultural production through seed purchases but, given the low reported income from
farm product sales, this is largely for household subsistence production.
Categories in which households sending female migrants expressed higher
importance of remittance income in meeting expenditure included transport, funerals and funeral policies, but otherwise the broad rankings are
similar for male and female migrant-sending households. Remittance
earnings certainly do not appear to be ‘squandered’ on luxury consumer
items, but rather are used, either directly or indirectly, to meet the household’s subsistence needs. In general, the pattern for expenditure of remittances reflects the patterns for overall household expenditure, and the
households of both male and female migrants stressed the importance of
remittances in enabling them to meet those needs.
The ‘typical’ male or female migrant from Lesotho sends home money,
which their households use to buy food and other basic goods and services, and brings home clothing, food and consumer goods (Table 36).
Consumer goods and ‘luxury’ items (e.g. electronic goods) are more readily available and also cheaper in South Africa, so it is not surprising to
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find them included here, but food and clothing still ranked well above
consumer goods in stated importance. Again, there is a striking similarity
between migrants of different gender.
Table 36: Most Important Goods Remitted by Migrants
Male Migrant-Sending

Female Migrant-Sending

Clothes

Clothes

Food

Food

Consumer goods

Consumer goods

In addition to making regular remittances, migrants send money home
in times of need or to meet unexpected costs. Funeral costs are by far the
most common, along with funds for weddings and other feasts. Lesotho,
which has the highest overall dependence on migrant remittances among
the countries surveyed, reported the lowest incidence of such ‘once-off’
or emergency remittances, although the levels were still considerable.
Some gender differences are evident (Table 37), with a higher proportion
of male migrants reported as sending money in times of need. This may
reflect their role as heads of household, with primary responsibility for
meeting such emergency needs.
Table 37: Proportion of Households Receiving Emergency Remittances
Male Migrant-Sending (%)

Female Migrant-Sending (%)

Lesotho

44.0

37.1

Mozambique

59.3

35.3

Swaziland

51.9

61.9

Zimbabwe

54.8

54.2

Source: SAMP Household Survey

Emergency remittances are clearly important to the households
receiving them. They are seen as important or very important by 98% of
migrant-sending households in Lesotho, with only very small differences
on the basis of migrant gender (Table 38).
Table 38: Stated Importance of Emergency Remittances
Male Migrant-Sending (%)

Female Migrant-Sending (%)

Very important

73.9

70.6

Important

24.5

27.5

Source: SAMP Household Survey

Overall, in gender terms, it is the similarities in the expenditure of
remittances from male and female migrants that are so strong and reveal58
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ing. Two important conclusions follow. First, for both male and female
migrants, migration is commonly undertaken in the role of primary
breadwinner, rather than as a supplement to other sources of household
income. Second, remittances are more important as means of securing
basic household livelihoods, alleviating poverty, and meeting emergency
costs than as drivers of broader economic development.
Many Focus Group participants observed that it was increasingly common for migrant men to establish second households in South Africa.
Sometimes these were relationships with South African women (in
which case the migrant could acquire South African identity documents
through marriage) and sometimes they were with migrant women from
Lesotho. The losers, from the perspective of people in Lesotho, were their
households at home:
Most people we know, especially men, do have families in
South Africa. In some cases they even leave with other
women from Lesotho to live with in South Africa. The new
family in South Africa puts a strain on the assistance the
migrant brings to his original family in Lesotho. He now
hardly ever sends or brings enough money to his Lesotho
family, if at all.88
A female participant put it more bluntly: “Households that do not
have migrants really struggle to make ends meet. But some also struggle
as the husbands hardly ever send a cent home and this could be because
they have families somewhere else.”89 Another felt that this phenomenon
was causing more women to migrate:
Women migrate in large numbers because our husbands can
no longer be relied upon. Many of us still have husbands
while the same number does not. I say men are unreliable
because when they get to South Africa, they enter into
extra-marital affairs and remarry. A man may actually leave
home in the company of a local woman but sometimes he
marries a South African woman. This implies that some
Basotho women really go to look for jobs while others do
not.90
The growing practice of establishing a new relationship, family or
household in South Africa also has a clear gender dimension, according to respondents. Female migrants also have relationships with men
in South Africa. In the case of male migrants, the practice leads to a
decreased flow of remittances to the household in Lesotho. However, in
the case of female migrants, it can actually augment rather than reduce
the flow of remittances to Lesotho:
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Men often establish second families in South Africa so
they have to share the money between two families. With
women, on the other hand, even if they find boyfriends in
South Africa they send the money the latter gives them
home, together with the money they earn themselves.91
One woman noted cynically that most men in this position “forget
about their original families” while women do not forget their families
and children in Lesotho. A woman would rather take what her “men
friends” give her and send it to her children.92

Remittances and Poverty Reduction

P

overty continues to be the major driving force behind internal
and cross-border migration in Lesotho. For most households
(except the most skilled) migration remains a household survival
strategy rather than a strategy for creating wealth and economic
development opportunity. Several studies have mapped the pervasive
nature of poverty in Lesotho, its causes and geographical distribution.93
Two longitudinal studies of poverty in the 1990s showed that despite positive national economic growth (primarily from the Lesotho Highlands
Water Project and the textile industry), poverty remained a chronic
problem in Lesotho. One study compared data from National Household
Budget Surveys in 1986-7 and 1994-5 and drew the following conclusion:
The data show that the incidence and severity of poverty
is greater among a number of social groups, female headed
households, people living in rural areas, especially in the
mountainous parts of Lesotho, the elderly, children, those
who rely upon agricultural production and agricultural
assets.94
The proportion of households below the poverty line was 58% at both
points in time.95 However, the severity of poverty increased for both poor
and ultra-poor households. Poor households tended to be larger and with
higher age dependency ratios. Other significant variables were the gender
and employment status of the household head. In 1986-7, 27% of poor
households were headed by women who were single, divorced, widowed
or abandoned, a figure that rose to 30% in 1994-5. The proportion of
female-headed households that were poor was 65% in 1986-7 and 62% in
1994-5 – a slight decrease. However, male-headed households in the poor
category decreased from 65% to 58%. De facto female-headed households (those with a male migrant spouse) experienced an increase in the
incidence and depth of poverty (from 48% to 55%), a clear consequence
of lay-offs in the South African mining industry.
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Unemployment was a key determinant of household poverty: more
than two-thirds of households with an unemployed household head were
below the poverty line at both points in time. Between 1986-7 and 19945, there was also a substantial increase in unemployment amongst heads
of poor households (from 18% to 31%). The proportion of female-headed
households falling below the poverty line increased from 70% to 78%
during this time period. The other significant change was more positive:
a fall in the proportion of households with self-employed heads falling
below the poverty line from 67% to 42%. Marked changes also occurred
in the major source of income for all households. In 1986-7, cash remittances were the major source of income for 35% of households, a figure
that had dropped to 23% in 1994-5. Amongst the poor, the fall was 31%
to 23% and amongst the non-poor, an even larger 40% to 24%. The proportion of households reporting local wages as the main source of income
increased from 17% to 27% overall: from 23% to 42% for the non-poor
and from only 13% to 16% for the poor. In other words, the relative
importance of external versus internal wages as a source of household
income shifted with mine retrenchments. And very few poor households
were able to make that shift. The main fallback for poor households was
agriculture (with 27% of households reporting it as the main source of
income in 1986-7 and 42% in 1994-5).
Many of these trends are evident in another study that revisited 328
households in 2002 that were first interviewed in 1993.96 The authors
conclude that Lesotho’s economic growth in the 1990s did not significantly reduce poverty. The proportion of poor households had risen to
68% by 2002. In 1993, 68% of the sample had no bank account or nothing in it; this had risen to 82% by 2002. Some 26% of the households
were chronically poor (i.e. below the poverty line in 1993 and still there
in 2002). Only 14% had risen above the poverty line while 28% had
fallen below it (the “descending poor.”).97 A third of the descending
poor households had experienced a change of head. Being chronically
poor was also positively correlated with having a female head. Access to
wage work (in Lesotho or in South Africa) was a critical determinant of
whether households stayed above the poverty line. Those above or moving above had much more significant and consistent access than those
that remained or fell below the poverty line. Some 34% of the households that had one or more wage workers in 1993 had none in 2002. Of
these, 49% had declined into poverty.
The most recent snapshot of contemporary household poverty was
provided by a 2006 SAMP poverty and migration survey of 1,224 households in all parts of Lesotho.98 Of 3,197 household members over 18,
only 22% were working full-time. Another 17% were working part-time,
leaving 61% unemployed. The study used the Afrobarometer Lived
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Poverty Index as a poverty measure.99 The LPI shows that only 41%
of households always have cash income and only 29% always have sufficient food (Table 39). As many as 23% said they never have enough
food to eat. Asked to compare household economic circumstances with
12 months previously, 43% said they were worse and 11% much worse.
Comparing households with and without migrants, the study found that
39% of migrant households but only 28% of non-migrant households satisfied their basic needs. As the study concludes: “There is a clear pattern
from the data which suggests that households with migrant workers are
more wealthy than those without and this clearly suggests that migration is a strong anti-poverty indicator.” What is equally clear is that even
households with part or full-time wage earners still struggle to secure a
livelihood.
While remittances are essential to household subsistence and wellbeing, this does not give a sense of the gendered nature and intensity of
the poverty and deprivation experienced by migrants’ households. Female
migrant-sending households in Lesotho are relatively more deprived than
male migrant-sending households (Table 39). Slightly over half of female
migrant-sending households reported going without food ‘several times’
or more in the previous year, compared to only 36% of male migrantsending households. A similar pattern was found for deprivation from
cash income: 62% for female migrant-sending households, 46% for male
migrant-sending households. Deprivation indices were more genderequivalent for electricity, water and fuel, but this is more a reflection of a
general lack of service provision, especially in rural areas, than of poverty
per se. Even for medicine and medical treatment, female migrant-sending
households are worse off than male migrant-sending households.
Lesotho’s female migrants (most of whom go to South Africa to work
in domestic service) evidently come from very poor, severely deprived
households that would likely be considerably worse off if they did not
have migrant remittances as a source of income. That ‘lived poverty’ is
so intensely and materially experienced by household members reinforces
the finding that migration from Lesotho to South Africa is important as a
household survival strategy.
In order to determine how the significance of migration is perceived
by sending households, respondents were asked to assess its overall
impact on a five-point scale from very positive to very negative. They
were also asked questions about the most positive and most negative
aspects of having household members working in another country.
Respondents were broadly positive about the overall impact of migration,
although more so for male than for female migration (Table 40). Close
to 70% of the male migrant-sending household respondents in Lesotho
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regard migration as having positive or very positive impacts. The proportion for female migrant-sending households was lower at 59%.
Table 39: Frequency of Household Deprivation of Basic Needs in Previous Year
Male Migrant-Sending (%)

Female Migrant-Sending (%)

Gone Without Food
Never

48.3

32.9

Once or twice

15.3

15.7

Several times

15.2

18.6

Many times

19.6

32.1

1.5

0.7

Always

Gone Without Clean Water
Never

34.4

39.3

Once or twice

14.0

10.0

Several times

17.8

17.9

Many times

27.1

29.3

6.7

3.6

Always

Gone Without Medicine or Medical Treatment
Never

37.6

32.1

Once or twice

28.2

25.7

Several times

18.3

20.7

Many times

14.3

17.9

1.7

3.6

Always

Gone Without Electricity
Never

4.8

3.6

Once or twice

2.1

0.7

Several times

0.6

0.0

Many times

0.7

0.0

91.8

95.7

Always

Gone Without Fuel for Cooking
Never

47.9

47.1

Once or twice

21.4

20.7

Several times

14.6

12.9

Many times

15.0

17.9

1.1

1.4

Always

Gone Without Cash Income
Never

26.3

19.3

Once or twice

28.1

17.9

Several times

17.6

22.9

Many times

25.6

33.6

2.4

5.7

Always
Source: SAMP Household Survey
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Table 40: Perceived Overall Impact of Migration on the Household
Male Migrant-Sending (%)

Female Migrant-Sending (%)

Very positive

34.4

17.9

Positive

35.2

41.5

Neither

2.3

2.1

Negative

13.9

17.1

Very negative

12.7

20.7

Don’t know

1.5

0.7

Total

100

100

N

841

140

Source: SAMP Household Survey

A significant proportion of the female migrant-sending households
from Lesotho regard the impact of migration as either negative or very
negative (38% compared to 27% of the male migrant-sending households.) This is especially interesting given the high levels of poverty and
deprivation in Lesotho’s female migrant-sending households and the significant contribution made by female migrant remittances to household
income and expenditure. Possible explanations are that the social costs
of migration are felt to outweigh the economic gains; or alternatively,
that female migration is indeed a ‘last resort’, and thus a source of shame
and embarrassment to the household, especially if it is related to marital
breakdown or to perceived male failure to earn a living for the family.
Female migration itself may be regarded by many in Lesotho as socially
inappropriate or undesirable, even though it is recognized as economically necessary.
Perceptions of the positive impacts of working in another country
reinforce the findings from income, expenditure and deprivation data,
i.e. that migration primarily improves household livelihoods (Table 41).
Differences based on the gender of the migrant are small. This supports
the finding that female migration is as economically important as male
migration, at least to the migrant-sending households themselves.
Table 41: Most Positive Effects of Migration on the Household
Male Migrant-Sending (%)
None
Supports household

16.2

Female Migrant-Sending (%)
24.7

6.9

5.6

Improved living conditions

63.2

58.6

Supports children’s education

11.7

11.1

<1

0.0

Job opportunities
Migrant acquires skills
N
Source: SAMP Household Survey
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Most Basotho families are simply struggling to survive. Remittances
are directed almost exclusively to the basic needs of household members.
The bulk of remittances are spent on necessities such as food, clothing,
school fees, medical supplies, cooking fuel and transportation. Very little is left over for investment in agricultural production or small business
development. Savings are almost non-existent. Yet, in some ways, the
country’s migrant-sending households are actually the fortunate few.
They are not at the top of the economic ladder, but they are above the
great majority at the bottom.

Remittances and Agriculture

L

esotho is still a predominantly rural society although urbanization is proceeding very rapidly. One reason, among many, is
declining agricultural production and productivity. Cereal production reached a high of about 200 kg per person in the mid1970s but is currently around the 50-60 kg level. The expected figure for
the 2007 season was its lowest point ever at 40 kg per person. The FAO
standard for subsistence production of cereal crops is a minimum of 180
kg per person, so that at present Lesotho is producing less than a quarter
of expected needs. Food insecurity is a constant for many households.
Every year, large quantities of the primary staple, maize, are imported
from South Africa.100 Given the grave lack of employment, the World
Food Programme declared a serious emergency in 2007-8 when about
400,000 people faced severe food insecurity.
Much of the recent difficulty can be attributed to drought, with severe
weather conditions prevailing over much of Southern Africa during the
period between 2004 and 2007. But loss of soil fertility is another factor,
since Lesotho’s arable land has been over-cultivated for many years. A
further reason is a slow reduction over the years in the number of fields
being cultivated. The downsizing of the mine migrant labour system has
reinforced the marginal position of farming in Lesotho. Households without access to mine remittances no longer have the resources to invest in
agriculture. Another factor of increasing importance is the loss of ablebodied agricultural labour because of HIV and AIDS. Many fields are still
cultivated, but the challenge is enormous: “Those affected households
that struggle on, often headed by old people or orphans, typically suffer
poverty because they are no longer able to farm as they did before, and/or
because their capacity to generate off-farm income has dwindled or disappeared.”101
MARS provided new insights into the relationship between agriculture and remittances (Table 42). Around a quarter of households bought
seed and one in five bought fertilizer. Around 15 percent used remit
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tances to assist with ploughing. Five percent used remittances to employ
people in their fields but less than 2% used remittances to purchase 
cattle. In other words, almost three-quarters of households do not spend
any of their remittances on agriculture-related activity. The survey also
showed that less than 3% of households receive income from the sale of
farm products. In other words, even when remittances are invested in
agriculture this is largely to try to increase food production for own 
consumption.
Table 42: Use of Remittances for Agriculture
% of HH
Seed

24.4

Fertiliser

18.5

Tractor Hire

12.5

Oxen for ploughing

2.5

Labour

5.1

Cattle purchase

1.4

Small stock purchase

1.1

Poultry purchase

0.8

Dipping and veterinary costs

2.6

Vehicle and transport costs

0.6

Equipment

0.3

Other farm input

0.4

Source: SAMP Household Survey

The experience of one ex-migrant farmer, a man of 70, clearly illustrates the constraints that households face.102 Many households have
no land which means they are unable to farm at all. This particular man
does have fields. His daughter and son are both migrants but he finds the
former a far more reliable remitter perhaps, he says, because he is looking
after her 13-year old son. However, she only remits R800 a year. He uses
the money to hire casual workers from the village to help him plough and
plant. He grows maize and wheat and sells his surplus produce and earns
about R1,600 a year. Most of this is spent on purchasing food and groceries so that he and his granddaughter and another young man who lives
with him can have a more varied diet.
His main challenges as a farmer are “the weather conditions, the
worst enemy being the droughts and hail, the other one is the attack of
the plants by pests” and lack of government support. He would like help
with a threshing machine, a place to store grain and a place to buy seeds
and insecticides. He has considered cash cropping of vegetables, “but
the problem is theft.” Another respondent said he receives the R3,000
remitted by his working spouse in a similar manner, although he only
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grows sorghum which he either sells “as is” or turns into malt which he
sells to beer-brewers in the area. His income from the sale of produce
was R3,500 the previous year. What is interesting about these two cases
is that they are both older men who view themselves as farmers and say
they have been farming since their youth. Few of today’s young men and
women would describe themselves this way.
Minding the Store

I am 48 years old. My husband has worked for many years on the
mines. I do not know how much he earns but I receive about
R17,000. The money is spent on food, transport, fuel, my motherin-law’s monthly hospital visits and paying school fees for my
brother-in-law’s three children who live in another household.
The money is also used to cover the farming activities like purchase of seed and fertilizer and paying for help with ploughing,
planting and harvesting. We grow food for our own use. Without
the money from my husband, these activities would not be possible. We would surely struggle to make ends meet.
We agreed that I should start a business using the money. I chose
to open a shop because it is the only kind of business I can operate myself although I sometimes hire someone to help out. I am
responsible for manning the shop, being a shop clerk. I draw lists
of stocks that need replenishing and go to Maseru (the capital
city) myself to buy the stocks. I also do the pricing of items and
the cleaning of the premises. The business is now successful as
it is self-sustaining and no longer depends on outside sources of
money to survive. The worst problem I experienced was that I
gave things to fellow villagers on credit and they delayed paying
me, while some even failed paying at all. My business collapsed
and my husband came to the rescue and injected remittance
money. Now I no longer give credit.
We have purchased several minibus taxis with his remittance
money. However, this business was not very successful with him
away and now we are left with only one taxi, which we pay someone to operate.
I make about R24,000 profit a year from the shop but the competition is closing in and it is non-Basotho. I feel angry about the
foreign business owners, especially the Chinese, who are renting
shops even at the village level and undercutting my prices. As a
result, no one goes to Basotho-owned shops any longer.
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Remittances and Small Business Development

T

he proportion of migrant-sending households investing remittances in formal and informal business is extremely low in
Lesotho. There is also no statistically significant difference
between male and female migrant-sending households. This
is an important point as households with male migrants receive more in
remittances than households with female migrants. Yet, the overwhelming majority of households in both categories (over 90%) do not receive
income from the sale of farm produce or from formal or informal business. And even the very small minority who do make extra income from
these sources do not make large sums (an average of R6,708 p.a. in
formal business, R3,066 p.a. in the informal sector and only R1,526 p.a.
from the sale of farm produce) (Table 43).
Table 43: Sources of Household Income in Male and Female Migrant-Sending Households
Source of Household Income

Male MigrantSending (%)

Female MigrantSending (%)

Average Income (M)

Farm product sales

2.4

2.8

1,525.93

Formal business

2.1

1.4

6,708.00
3,066.41

Informal business

6.5

6.4

N

841

140

Source: SAMP Household Survey

Remittances to Lesotho are largely a zero-sum game. The money
comes in from South Africa and is spent mostly on South African or
other foreign imports, especially foodstuffs and clothing. Efforts to create
small businesses through sharing of resources have not been successful over the years. CARE attempted in the 1980s and 1990s to create
mohair-spinning and seed-multiplication projects. They depended on foreign subsidies to keep going, and in the end only one made even a marginal impact on the economy of the village where it was located. IFAD
developed credit associations in roughly the same time period, but they
never succeeded. The Ministry of Agriculture’s credit union was useful
only to provide seed to farmers, but it always lost money, mostly because
of bad loans.
The qualitative research identified a few individuals who did use
remittances for some form of entrepreneurial activity. Their experience is
certainly of relevance since it (a) helps explain why so few households in
Lesotho invest remittances in entrepreneurial activity; (b) identifies the
obstacles which entrepreneurial individuals face and (c) permits recommendations on how the proportion of entrepreneurs might be expanded.
One young skilled manual worker in the construction industry in
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Johannesburg has worked for a building contractor for two years.103 He is
an irregular migrant and earns R22,000 a year. He remits around R5,000
a year in cash and R7,000 worth of goods to his large household:
I am the main provider in the household of twelve people.
All these people need food and clothing. The money I send
meets only two basic needs i.e. food and soap. There are
complaints about the amount of money I send because they
are a large family. I normally send the money to my two
older brothers who are in charge. We have one married sister working in South Africa as well. I send the money home
through the bank. Owing to the size of the household, the
money is just enough to buy food, but little as it is it makes
some difference because without it, life would be difficult.
When anybody falls ill at home, they just phone me and I
send the money as they require.
The sheer size of the household places an extraordinary burden.
However, he believes that there are “business opportunities for citizens of
Lesotho (in South Africa) but the problem is getting proper documentation and raising enough funds.” His aim is certainly “to open a business
thus helping my family and community.” He has begun in a small way
and made R800 in December: “When I am here at this time of year, I sell
beer, soft drinks and some cigarettes. The business is doing well particularly at this time of year. When I go back to South Africa, I think it will
die a natural death unless my other brothers who are still here give it a
serious thought.”
Several female entrepreneurs have realized the ‘dream’ of opening
small shops though not without considerable obstacles. All are married
to current or ex-miners and have successfully used mine remittances in
their small business ventures. Perhaps the most successful is in her mid40s and lives with her teenage daughter and 24-year old son.104 Her
spouse has been working on the mines for 18 years and currently remits
around R36,000 p.a. She started a grocery shop with remittances but
did not generate much profit. In 2008, she switched to selling alcohol
that she buys from a liquor store in another village. She hires someone
to run the store and made a profit of R92,400 in 2008. Of this she saved
R24,000 p.a. at a bank as a retirement fund for her and her husband. Her
plans for further expansion are hampered only by her inability to get a
substantial loan. Another successful entrepreneur is a 25-year-old who
supports her elderly mother and four children.105 When her husband
was retrenched from the mines, she started a small spaza shop brewing
and selling traditional beer and buying and selling small items such as
matches and candles. Her husband got another job in South Africa and
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continues to remit about R10,000 p.a. She travels to the capital Maseru
to buy goods for her shop where she also sells vegetables she has grown at
home. She makes about R3,000 a year from the shop and another R1,500
from beer sales. Her transport costs to and from Maseru are exorbitant
(R2,500 a year). In the villages, there is also increasing competition from
Chinese storeowners.
Individual entrepreneurial opportunities in the rural villages are limited. Though not everyone can run or afford to run a spaza or a sheebeen, many of these outlets throughout the country were started (and are
sometimes sustained) by remittances. However, the start-up and running
costs (even with low overheads) are such that these are run primarily
by the spouses of migrant mineworkers (who are amongst the best-paid
migrants).
Focus Group participants spoke of current and ex-mineworkers who
have also successfully entered the taxi business. One man had started by
running a shop and then bought a minibus taxi with the proceeds: “Now
he has many.”106 Another man got together with his friends from another
village and started a taxi business. He first purchased a second-hand taxi
and then worked “very hard” until he was able to buy another. He now
owns five and hires drivers and conductors. Public transport is poor in
Lesotho and many people travel by minibus taxi within the country and
when they go to South Africa. The routes are highly competitive and it
is a cut-throat business. The capital outlay is considerable, however, and
well beyond the means of most migrant workers, especially women.
In the villages in Lesotho, burial societies and grocery associations
effectively “pool” a portion of remittance receipts though not primarily
for entrepreneurial reasons. Two Focus Group respondents described how
these operate:
There are burial societies within the community and members have to pay monthly contributions towards the time
when one of the members has a death in the family and the
society has to pay what is due to them. There are also grocery associations whereby monthly payments are also made
by members towards purchasing of Christmas groceries and
food. The money is also available for borrowing by members,
to be paid back with interest. The main problem is non-payment of borrowed money and interest. There are separate
male and female associations within the community. The
women have the grocery associations.107
There are associations within the community. There are
burial societies and an egg producer association known as
Egg Circle, where members are given the privilege of having
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their eggs sold before everyone else. Burial societies differ
but members commonly pay a monthly subscription of an
agreed amount and when they have a death in the family
the society gives them their agreed dues, whether money,
a coffin or a cow. Problems occur when people do not pay
their subscription for a long time in which case they would
receive nothing if they had a death, unless they pay what
they owe. The other problem is that more people are dying
from AIDS these days and that puts strain on the coffers
of the societies as sometimes the societies would have as
many as three deaths in a week or month whereas before
they would sometimes spend as long as six months without a
death.108
Respondents in one village said there were a lot of “women’s organizations” in the area including food and grocery associations. As well as
loaning out money to be paid back with interest at the end of the year,
the associations buy food and groceries in bulk to divide among themselves. There is also a men’s-only association but the women are “leaving them in the dust” as their associations are growing “in leaps and
bounds.”109
The household survey showed that 12% of households borrowed
money from informal moneylenders in the previous year. Some of the
moneylenders are actually migrants who use their earnings (in South
Africa) and remittances (in Lesotho) to loan money to needy persons
or households. While it is a useful way for the benefits of remittances to
be spread more broadly, most households only borrow to meet emergencies. Informal moneylenders are known as bo-machonisa (loan sharks) in
Lesotho and charge their clients “inhumane” interest.110 They commonly
take people’s passports as surety for loans and charge interest rates of
30-50%. One mineworker interviewed for this study, for example, joined
with a group of friends and they all pay R2,000 into a common pool at
the beginning of each year. They then make loans to those who need
emergency funds and charge interest of 50%. At the end of the year,
they receive their original investment back plus their share of the profits. According to the migrant, this helps him to cover the extra costs of
the ‘festive season.’ Such enterprising activity is viewed with distaste by
poorer households or those who are forced for lack of alternatives to avail
themselves of the moneylending ‘service.’ This form of ‘entrepreneurship’
may be a profitable use of remittances but it clearly undermines social
capital and deepens the poverty of other households.
The main obstacle that confronts many migrants and remittancereceiving households is the small size of the remittance package and the
fact that most of it is consumed on daily expenses. Most households find
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that by the time the remittance package has been spent on basic needs
(food, clothing, transport, fuel, school fees and hospital visits), there is
very little left over for productive income-generating investment. There
is a clear gender dimension to this issue. As noted above, men (mainly
migrant miners) can earn three or four times as much as women (mainly
domestic and farm workers) and can remit more than women. Women’s
earnings and remittances are paltry and the researchers were able to find
only one household where women’s remittances were used (in this case
by their father) to generate additional income through farming. However,
the household was small and the expenditures on basic needs lower so
there was a small surplus. Focus Group respondents were keen to explain
how difficult it is in Lesotho to use remittances to establish a business. As
one man noted:
It is not easy to establish some business. Let me explain it
this way. I may send money home but it happens that it is
not enough for a business because, first, when I left, I might
already have had some debts....There is also too much sharing of money before it reaches the destination. It is TEBA
this side, debts on the other and clothing for the children
there, so it cannot be used for business. There is no migrant
who has managed to establish a business here.111
The female migrants concurred: “Money that we send home is not
used for farming nor for business.” The money is “all used for family
needs and there is always none left to start a business.”112 The fact that
so few households in the national survey invest in business activity certainly bears this out.
One woman stated quite categorically that, “remittances are not used
for business purposes, whether big or small. Money is often sent to cover
certain needs. The money that is sent is little and after all is done, nothing remains to start a business.”113 In many cases, migrants remit whatever they can and there is little or any surplus at the end of the month to
save, invest, or to establish a small enterprise. However, the proportion of
the wage package that is remitted does vary considerably even amongst
migrants making the same amount of money.
Part of this is because of the variable costs that migrants encounter
in South Africa. Migrant miners and most domestic workers usually get
free board and lodging while at work. Others have to pay rent and for
their own food. If the migrant is in another relationship or has a second
household in South Africa, the remittance flow to Lesotho is reduced
accordingly. However, it is still likely that there is an element of discretion in voluntary remitting. In other words, it is possible that the amount
remitted is actually determined by the livelihood needs of the household
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and that any surplus remains in South Africa and is spent there. Why, in
other words, send more when there are so few opportunities for business
development in Lesotho?
The second major obstacle is the lack of capital and loan financing for
those who wish to develop a business. Some respondents blamed the government for not assisting more:
You come with the little you worked for with difficulty but
you will be required to pay for so many things that what
you had will get finished even before you start. When you
establish a business your intention is to live and help other
Basotho do so but our government does not help. There is a
boulder blocking and we are not aware of it.114
Others complained about the lack of loan facilities: “Our banks,
which have our money, cannot give us loans.”115 Even micro-finance is
difficult to obtain in Lesotho.
Most migrant-sending households are forced to borrow money during
the course of the year, because the remittance flow is either insufficient
or irregular (Table 44). The majority (46%) borrow from family and
friends, presumably largely interest-free. Very few borrow to finance an
entrepreneurial activity. Less than 1% had borrowed money from banks
or formal moneylenders. Less than 5% had obtained loans from microfinance organizations. Apart from family and friends, the most common
way of obtaining a loan was from informal moneylenders (12% of households).
Table 44: Sources of Borrowed Funds
%
Friends
Employer
Burial society

28.0
0.5
5.9

Family

18.3

Church

0.2

Bank

0.4

Savings group

3.4

Union

2.9

Moneylenders (formal)

0.5

Moneylenders (informal)

12.1

Micro-finance organisations

4.3

Other source

0.1

Source: SAMP Household Survey
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Thirdly, the net worth of remittance transfers is reduced in several
ways. As noted, there are the transaction costs of money transfer. Very
few migrants use formal money transfer channels so this is not as big an
issue as it is in other countries. However, transaction costs are not absent
even for informal channels. Net income, and therefore remitting potential, is also reduced by the fact that some migrants are double-taxed (in
South Africa and again in Lesotho). Then there is the major problem
of corruption. Some miners were particularly critical of their recruiting
agency, TEBA, and its Lesotho operations:
We normally send money home through TEBA but the
problem is our spouses have to stand in long queues and
sometimes end up not receiving the money. There is much
corruption at TEBA. Our spouses are forced to pay bribes to
get the service. It is painful that you remit M1,000 and M20
is deducted for a bribe. The money now is already short to
cover all that was supposed to be covered. TEBA does not
care for us mineworkers.116
No doubt this kind of corruption by TEBA employees is not condoned
by management but they could do more to root it out. Also problematic
for migrants is widespread corruption at the border. One study even
argues that border posts between South Africa exist not to control the
flow of people but to allow the personal enrichment of border officials.117
Again, this “business of the border” is not condoned by either government but they seem powerless to prevent it. One of the major forms of
corruption that emerged in this study was the practice of permit renewal
forced on migrants by the fact that entry to South Africa is limited to 30
days. Migrants who have overstayed in South Africa have to pay bribes
to border officials on return or, alternatively, pay for their passports to be
taken to the border for stamping, and thus more money flows into official
pockets.
Fourthly, the surveys discussed in this report indicate that remitting
from South Africa takes the following form: a migrant from a household
goes to South Africa, works and remits small amounts at regular intervals
to the individual household who spend the funds on basic needs such
as food, clothing, education, health and transport. There is no evidence
of what has been called in other contexts “collective remitting”; that is,
groups of migrants pooling remittances and remitting to support a broader community development initiative. But migrants do form mutual help
associations in South Africa (such as stokvels and burial societies) and in
Lesotho itself there are mutual help associations in virtually every village
and community (burial societies, grocery associations and egg circles).
Further research is needed on the operation, organization and impact of
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these associations. They are grassroots organizations amongst migrantsending households and help to build social capital in migrant communities. Their potential as development agents has barely been examined
but it seems that they do have considerable potential, if supported in the
right way, to add development value to the efforts of individual migrants
at the level of the community as a whole.
A fifth obstacle to improving the development impacts of migration and remittances is inherent to the regulatory framework governing
movement between Lesotho and South Africa. Only miners and some
skilled migrants can get residence and work permits in South Africa.
Everyone else has to go on 30-day visitor’s permits. The moment they
work in South Africa they are doing so irregularly. This makes migrants
vulnerable to exploitation by employers, compromises their basic rights
and means that they cannot do simple things like open a bank account
in South Africa. Lesotho places no restrictions on the migration of its
citizens to South Africa for work. The government’s only concern is that
people do not move permanently to South Africa or cut their ties with
home. This concern is founded on the fear that scarce skills will be lost
and remittance flows will decline.
Finally, a major obstacle to realizing the development potential of
remittances in Lesotho lies in “structural development constraints”:
A critical reading of the empirical literature leads to the
conclusion that it would be naïve to think that despite their
often considerable benefits for individuals and communities, migration and remittances alone can remove more
structural development constraints. Despite their development potential, migrants and remittances can neither be
blamed for a lack of development nor be expected to trigger
take-off development in generally unattractive investment
environments. By increasing selectivity and suffering among
migrants, current immigration restrictions have a negative
impact on migrants’ wellbeing as well as the poverty and
inequality.118
There can be few peaceful developing countries where the “investment environment” is more unattractive than in Lesotho. In other words,
even if receiving households had remittances to invest in entrepreneurial
and other income-generating activities, what could they possibly invest
in? This raises a key issue that requires further exploration. How feasible is it for migrant workers from Lesotho to engage in entrepreneurial
activities in South Africa where the opportunities are much greater
than in Lesotho? Can loans and micro-credit be obtained more easily in
South Africa? These questions suggest that it is important to stop seeing
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Lesotho as the only site for entrepreneurship by migrants from Lesotho.
South Africa should also be seen as a potential site and market for the
migrant entrepreneur and his or her dependents. Certainly this is very
true for cross-border traders who buy and sell in South African towns.
It should also be true for other forms of business enterprise. This would
require a change in public policy in South Africa.

Policy Implications

T

here is little doubt that South Africa would never have developed into a modern industrial state without cheap migrant
labour from neighbouring countries such as Lesotho. If Lesotho
were ever to claim reparations for the value of labour expended
and lives lost and families wrecked by the South African mines, the claim
would probably bankrupt the South African fiscus. We make this point
only to indicate that the development of South Africa and Lesotho are
inextricably linked, and always have been: “If Lesotho and South Africa
were truly distinct and separate, it would be natural to speak of migration
or immigration” from one to the other.119 But they are not.
Lesotho is an impoverished, dependent and economically vulnerable state because of South Africa. Basotho migrants cannot be kept out
of South Africa and they will come in ever greater numbers if the only
employment and other economic opportunities are in South Africa itself.
That much is certain. But why should South African employers be permitted to take advantage of their poverty and vulnerable status by paying
them sub-minimum wages, abusing their basic labour and human rights
and using them to undercut unions and undermine labour standards?
Lesotho ratified the UN ICMW in the hope that South Africa would
do likewise and begin to offer its migrants basic rights and protections,
not a continuation of the situation under apartheid.120 So far, the South
African government (like receiving states around the world) has studiously ignored the Convention.
Migration needs to be re-conceptualized in public policy not as a
threat to the interests of South Africans but as something that is (and
could be even more) mutually beneficial to both countries. The only realistic way for this to happen is to open the border to free travel in both
directions. This would involve allowing Basotho to own land and seek
jobs in South Africa without losing their citizenship. Lesotho’s government would continue to be responsible for social services within its own
borders, but Basotho would have the chance to improve their material
conditions within South Africa and to remit in much greater volumes to
their dependants that remain at home.121
The SADC Protocol on the Facilitation of Movement has been for76
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mally adopted at the Summit of the Heads of States and been signed by
nine member states which now allows for the drafting of an implementation plan.122 However, for the Protocol to come into effect, at least nine
member states must have ratified it. The ultimate objective of the protocol is “is to develop policies aimed at the progressive elimination of obstacles to the movement of persons of the Region generally into and within
the territories of State Parties” by facilitating three types of movement:
• Entry, for a lawful purpose and without a visa, into the territory
of another State for a maximum period of ninety (90) days per
year for bona fide visits and in accordance with the laws of the
State concerned. The person must enter through an official border post, possess valid travel documents and produce evidence
of sufficient means of support for the duration of the visit. The
Protocol is silent on what a migrant may or may not do during
these three months.
• Movement for Residence defined as “permission or authority, to
live in the territory of a State Party in accordance with the legislative and administrative provisions of that State Party." The
Protocol also encourages member states to facilitate the issuing of
residence permits;
• Movement known as Establishment defined as "permission or
authority granted by a State Party in terms of its national laws,
to a citizen of another State Party, for: (a) exercise of economic
activity and profession either as an employee or a self-employed
person; and (b) establishing and managing a profession, trade,
business or calling.
The Protocol makes it clear that entry for all three reasons will be
governed by the national legislation of the SADC member state that they
are entering.
In 2001, the Departments of Home Affairs in both South Africa and
Lesotho asked SAMP to conduct research on cross-border movement
between the two countries and to make recommendations on how to
facilitate movement between them. This resulted in an extensive report
that questioned whether the considerable resources to manage border
operations were being effectively utilized and recommended the downgrading of the current border regime.123 A Joint Bilateral Commission for
Co-operation (JBCC) between the two countries was signed in 2001. The
JBCC is used as a vehicle to drive forward areas of co-operation between
the two countries and by mid-2007, 20 subsidiary cooperation agreements
had been signed.
Since Lesotho and South Africa have both ratified the Protocol, they
clearly have no fundamental objections. There is therefore every reason
for them to move forward bilaterally to implement all three phases with
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immediate effect. In 2002, a bilateral Agreement on the Facilitation of
Cross Border Movement of Citizens between South Africa and Lesotho
was drafted. The Agreement was independently approved by the
Cabinets of both countries in 2005-6 and finally signed in June 2007.
This agreement calls primarily for an easing of border controls between
the two countries. This is a start but it does not go nearly far enough
and has still not been implemented. The aim of both states should
be a broader agreement which is consistent with the SADC Protocol
and which includes not only Entry but also Residence and, especially,
Establishment.
The research for this report has shown, at the national and household
level, that migration from Lesotho is deeply and profoundly gendered.
Feminization of migration is proceeding rapidly but this does not mean
that a homogenous de-gendered “migrant” is emerging. There are major
and entrenched differences between male and female migrants in terms
of their socio-demographic profile, their occupations and opportunities in
South Africa and their remitting behavior. Similarly, within Lesotho itself,
there are significant differences between male-sending and female-sending households. The latter are worse off than the former and have even
fewer opportunities for income-generating activity outside of migration.
The gendered nature of migration and its differential impact on men and
women needs to be recognized and factored into all debates and policies
for mainstreaming migration in development in Lesotho.
The migration and development debate has been hampered by the
fact that the main “players” are nation-states between which migrants
move or circulate. This is particularly problematic in the case of South
Africa and Lesotho because it foregrounds the role of regulatory frameworks and control policies in relation to migration between the two
countries. As this report has argued, it is precisely this kind of thinking that has seriously hampered two states that are inextricably bound
together in every way from moving forward to a ‘new immigration
compact’ of free movement, unrestricted economic opportunity and
heightened remittance flow. There are promising signs that the reality of
co-development is being recognized but much more needs to be done to
ensure that the migration and remittance regime becomes a true “winwin” for both countries and for both male and female migrants.
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